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Misplaced Priorities: The Utah Digital 
Signature Act and Liability Allocation 
in a Public Key Infrastructure* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 9, 1995, the Utah Digital Signature Act (the "Utah Act") 
was signed into law. 1 Complex and ambitious, the Utah Act is intended 
to promote the use of digital signatures on computer-based documents 
and to facilitate electronic commerce.2 The Utah Act implements an 
infrastructure in which computer users utilize "certification authorities," 
online databases called repositories, and public-key encryption technolo-
gy in order to "sign" electronic documents in a legally binding fashion. 
In addition to setting out a regulatory scheme designed to implement this 
infrastructure, the Utah Act provides certain digital signatures with legal 
status as valid signatures and addresses a variety of issues relating to the 
status of digitally-signed electronic documents in contract and evidence 
law. 
* B.A. University of California, San Diego; J.D. candidate, University of San 
Diego, May 1997. The author will be joining the San Diego office of Cooley God ward, 
LLP as an associate upon graduation. This Comment generally reflects developments 
through April 8, 1996. Special thanks to my wife Mare for all of her support. This 
comment is dedicated to our daughter Sophie, born February 5, 1996, with whom I spent 
many late nights pacing the floor and discussing the intricacies of public key 
cryptography. 
I. The Utah Digital Signature Act was enacted by 1995 Utah S.B. 82, creating 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -504 (Supp. 1995). It was significantly amended by 
1996 Utah S.B. 188, which repealed and reenacted large portions of the Act. The Act 
is found in its amended fonn at 1996 Utah Laws 46-3-101 to -502 (and will, when 
codified, add those sections to the Utah Code). When this Comment cites to a code 
section, it is referring to the 1996 amended version of the Act unless otherwise noted. 
An account of the history of the Utah Act can be found in DIVISION OF CORPORA TIO NS 
AND COMMERCIAL CODE, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, UTAH DIGITAL 
SIGNATURE LAW: TECHNJCALL Y AND LEGALLY SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 17-18 
(November 1995) (drafting committee's commentary to the now-enacted amended version 
of the Utah Act) [hereinafter UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW]. 
2. § 46-3-102. 
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The potential benefits of the "public key infrastructure" implemented 
by the Utah Act are considerable. Conceivably, a well-functioning 
public key infrastructure could allow private individuals, businesses, and 
government to routinely and securely conduct personal, financial, and 
legal affairs over open networks like the Internet.3 Legislation can 
potentially facilitate the development of this type of infrastructure. As 
the Utah Act illustrates, legislation can clarify the arguably uncertain 
legal status of digital signatures, determine liability standards in an 
emerging and unprecedented certification authority industry, clarify the 
rights and responsibilities of infrastructure participants, and address other 
important public policy concerns. In light of the significance of these 
issues, it is not surprising that more than ten states are following in 
Utah's footsteps and developing digital signature legislation. 
As further described in Section IV of this Comment, the Utah Digital 
Signature Act has become a putative "Model Act" which other state 
legislatures are looking to when developing digital signature legislation. 
Thus, it is particularly important to recognize certain policy choices 
made by, and certain problems with, the Utah Act. This Comment 
analyzes one of these problem areas: the allocation of liability and 
evidentiary burdens.4 
The drafters of the Utah Act made policy choices concerning liability 
allocation which are troubling. Consumers who participate in the 
infrastructure developed under the Utah Act subject themselves to a far 
greater risk of extensive liability than they face in a variety of analogous 
situations, and face difficult evidentiary burdens in resolving disputes 
that arise under the Act. Additionally, the financial responsibility 
provisions of the Utah Act create a de facto liability cap for one actor 
in the infrastructure, the certification authority, at an amount that could 
be significantly less than the actual damages a certification authority 
could cause. 
3. For a general introduction to the Internet, see ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET 
(1992). For a discussion of the advantages of the Internet over value-added networks 
(VANs) as a business tool, see Colleen Frye, EDI Users Explore Internet as Tool of 
Trade, SOFTWARE MAG., Dec. 1995, at 83 ("lower costs and more freedom are earning 
the 'Net a look as a vehicle for business commerce"). For a discussion of the 
disadvantages of the Internet relative to V ANs, see BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE EDI E-MAIL AND THE INTERNET: TECHNOLOGY, PROOF, AND 
LIABILITY§ ETl.3.5 (2d ed. 1995). See also Internet Commerce Hung Up on Security, 
EDI NEWS, Feb. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ZTLI File (noting that 
the Internet is "still daunting as a commercial vehicle" because of security concerns). 
4. Some other criticisms of the Utah Act are surveyed in note 120, infra. A 
number of issues related to a public key infrastructure have recently been addressed in 
A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic 
Commerce, 75 U. OR. L. REV. 49 (1996). 
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This Comment begins by presenting a brief overview of digital 
signature technology in Section II (which can be skipped by those 
readers already familiar with basic cryptographic techniques without any 
significant loss of context). A summary of the Utah Digital Signature 
Act follows in Section III. Section IV describes the Utah Digital 
Signature Act's status as a putative "Model Act," and suggests that this 
status may not be entirely appropriate. In Section V, the focus turns to 
a comparison of the liability allocations and evidentiary burdens imposed 
by the Utah Act to three analogous models: the credit card model, the 
notary model, and the telecommunications toll fraud model. As part of 
the discussion of the credit card model, this Comment discusses the 
likely preemption of the Utah Act under certain limited circumstances 
by the consumer protection-oriented Electronic Fund Transfer Act.5 An 
alternative approach to the apportionment of liability in a public key 
infrastructure is proposed, based upon a proposed reform in the 
analogous arena of telecommunications toll fraud. Ultimately this 
Comment asserts that the liability allocations of the Utah Act inappropri-
ately impose potentially unlimited risk on users of digital signatures, 
ignoring an important policy of consumer protection. This Comment 
additionally asserts that the provisions of the Utah Act which limit the 
liability of certification authorities undermine the economic integrity of 
the infrastructure implemented by the Act. Lawmakers contemplating 
digital signature legislation should reconsider some of the policy choices 
made by the Utah Act. 
II. DIGITAL SIGNATURES 
Two preliminary observations are appropriate before exploring the 
technology behind digital signatures. First, digital signatures are not 
digital images of manually signed names. Rather, as further described 
below, the term describes a method of digital file encryption which 
facilitates verification of the integrity and authenticity of digital 
messages.6 
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1995). 
6. Peter N. Weiss argues that the tenn "digital signature" is misleading in many 
ways, particularly because the tenn sparks the inference that legislation is necessary in 
order to accommodate the technology into the common law and statutory framework of 
written signatures. He notes that an awkward but more accurate description is "public 
key-based cryptographic originator authentication." E-mail message from Peter N. Weiss 
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Second, from a legal perspective, understanding the underlying 
technology of digital signatures is perhaps less important than under-
standing what using digital signatures can accomplish. If Alice "signs" 
an electronic document with a digital signature and sends it via 
electronic mail over the Internet to Bob, ideally Bob can be assured that, 
first, the document really came from Alice. Forging electronic mail 
messages on the Internet is easily accomplished. Digital signatures 
provide assurance that a message has in fact come from its purported 
sender. This assurance supplied by a digital signature is called "proof 
of origin" or "data origin authentication."7 Second, Bob can be sure that 
the document he received is the exact document that Alice sent-it has 
not been altered since Alice sent it. A message sent over an open 
network like the Internet may pass through dozens of computer systems, 
each owned and operated by different entities. At every stage in this 
process the message is vulnerable to alteration. A digital signature 
enables a recipient to verify that a message has not been intentionally or 
accidentally altered, a quality known as "message integrity."8 Third, 
Bob is assured that Alice cannot later deny that she sent the message (in 
order to avoid a promise that she made in the message, for example). 
No one but Alice could have sent the message, and Bob can prove it 
unequivocally. This quality of digital signatures is known as "non-
repudiation. "9 
Achieving the three qualities of data origin authentication, message 
integrity, and non-repudiation requires the use of sophisticated crypto-
graphic technology (which can be built into computer software or 
hardware) and the use of trusted third parties who can provide certain 
to C. Bradford Biddle (February 23, 1996) (printed copy on file with author). See 
generally Peter N. Weiss, Security Requirements and Evidentiary Issues in the 
Interchange of Electronic Documents: Steps Towards Developing a Security Policy, 12 
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 425 (1993). 
7. Michael J. Ganley, Digital Signatures and Their Uses, 13 COMPUTERS & 
SECURITY 385 (1994). See also BRUCE SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY: How TO KEEP 
YOUR ELECTRONIC MESSAGES PRIVATE 98 ( 1995) [hereinafter SCHNEIER, E-MAIL 
SECURITY]. SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY is highly recommended as an excellent general 
introduction to the fundamentals of cryptography. Another excellent introduction to 
cryptography and digital signatures is Paul Fahn, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions 
About Today's Cryptography, published by RSA Laboratories, a division of RSA Data 
Security, on the Internet in a hypertext version at <http://www.rsa.com/ 
rsalabs/faq/faq_horne.htrnl> and in an ASCII version at <http://www.rsa.com/pub/faq/ 
faq.asc> (September 20, 1993) [hereinafter "RSA FAQ"]. This Comment cites to the 
section numbers of the RSA FAQ as presented in the ASCII version. A more 
sophisticated and comprehensive introduction to cryptography can be found in BRUCE 
SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE 
IN C (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY]. 
8. Ganley, supra note 7, at 385. 
9. Id. 
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identification requirements and other services. The remainder of Section 
II discusses the mathematics and technology underlying digital signa-
tures, and the institutional infrastructure that is necessary in order to 
make digital signatures work effectively. 
A. Public Key Cryptography 
Public key cryptography, developed in 1976, was a profound 
breakthrough in the science of cryptography. 10 Prior to the development 
of public key cryptography, cryptographers traditionally used secret key 
cryptography. Using secret key cryptography, both the sender and 
recipient of a message share the same secret piece of information, called 
a key, which is used in conjunction with an algorithm to both encrypt 
and decrypt (scramble and unscramble) the message. 11 Secret key 
cryptography is ill-suited for communications over open computer 
networks, because of logistical problems inherent in securely communi-
cating the secret key to a would-be correspondent (particularly challeng-
ing if there are many potential correspondents) and a number of other 
security-related reasons. 12 
Public key cryptography, in contrast, is well-suited for use on open 
computer networks. 13 It utilizes two different paired keys: an individu-
al has a "public key," which they make widely available, and a "private 
key," which is kept secret. One way that public key cryptography can 
be used is to send confidential messages. If Alice wished to send a 
message to Bob which only he could read, she would first locate his 
public key, which he may have published in a publicly-accessible online 
10. See, e.g., SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, supra note 7, at 31 ("In 1976 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman changed the paradigm of cryptography forever."). 
Cryptography is the art and science of keeping messages secure; it is practiced by 
cryptographers. Id. at I. The process of disguising a message in such a way as to hide 
its substance is called encryption; the process of returning the message to its original 
form is called decryption. Id. See also RSA FAQ, supra note 7, at § I. I ("Encryption 
is the transformation of data into a form unreadable by anyone without a secret 
decryption key."). 
11. An algorithm is a mathematical formula that describes the scrambling 
technique; it does not need to be kept secret. SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY. supra 
note 7, at 2 - 3. 
12. See SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY, supra note 7, at 41-42; RSA FAQ, supra 
note 7, at§ 1.4. 
13. See SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY, supra note 7, at 43; RSA FAQ, supra note 
7,at§ 1.4 
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database. Alice would encrypt the message using his public key (and a 
public key algorithm) and send it to him. Bob would decrypt the 
message using his private key (and the same public key algorithm). 
Once the message was encrypted with Bob's public key, only his private 
key could decrypt the message--so if an eavesdropper intercepted it, 
they could not read it. Anyone who wanted to send an encrypted 
message to Bob could go through the same process, even if they had 
never communicated with Bob before. Public key cryptography 
eliminates the need for two correspondents to agree upon a secret key. 14 
Computer equipment and software utilizing public key cryptography 
is sometimes termed an "asymmetric cryptosystem." This term is used 
in the Utah Act. 15 
B. Digital Signatures 
Digital signatures involve reversing the role of public and private key, 
utilizing public key cryptography to achieve goals other than confidenti-
ality. For example, if Alice encrypted the message to Bob using her 
private key, Bob could decrypt the message using Alice's public key, 
which he might find in a public database. Bob could be assured that 
\ 4. Public key cryptography utilizes two components, a set of paired keys and an 
algorithm. A number of different public key cryptographic algorithms exist. These 
algorithms are proprietary and patentable, and several have been the subject of intense 
and acrimonious intellectual property disputes. See The Friendliest of Enemies Shaky 
Marriage Between Crypto Firms Shatters Cy/ink, RSA do Battle over Future of 
Electronic Commerce, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP., Sept. 9, 1994, available in 
LEXIS, MARKET Library, JACNWS File; Ugly Till the End Cy/ink Gains Edge in 
Crypto Case, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP., Sept. 29, I 995; Splitting the Baby, 
Again RSA-Cy/ink Arbitrators Revisit Crypto Mess, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP., 
Feb. 9, 1996; SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, supra note 7, at 609-10. Additionally, 
they can be implemented in different ways. For example, RSA, the leading public key 
algorithm, can be used for encryption (that is, to provide the quality of confidentiality) 
as well as to create digital signatures. DSA, a U.S. government endorsed algorithm, can 
theoretically only be used to create digital signatures---it cannot be used for encryption. 
Thus, a system which utilized the DSA algorithm alone theoretically could not achieve 
the quality of confidentiality. See SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY, supra note 7, at 45, 47. 
The use of powerful cryptography by private citizens for the purposes of achieving 
confidentiality of data messages and files is the source of immense political controversy, 
pitting law enforcement officials (who want access to all electronic communications) 
against business interests (who chafe at the current export restrictions on cryptography, 
see International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120 (1996)) and civil 
libertarians. For an excellent summary of the many legal issues implicated in this 
debate, see A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper 
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709 (1995). For additional background 
information, visit the Internet sites of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) 
at <http://www.epic.org> and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) at 
<http://www.eff.org>. 
15. § 46-3-I03(2). 
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Alice sent the message because if the message can be decrypted using 
Alice's public key, then it must have been encrypted using her private 
key. Thus, Alice and Bob have achieved "data origin authentication." 
Digital signatures, as contemplated under the Utah Act, involve 
another step: the one-way hash function. A one-way hash function is 
a mathematical process that is used to take a message of any length and 
create a short, fixed-length "hash" unique to that message, called a 
message digest. 16 Each time a message is run through the hash 
function it will result in the same value, but no two distinct messages 
will return the same value. 17 The hash function is "one way" because 
it is virtually impossible to reconstruct the original message using the 
message digest. 18 
If Alice wants to "sign" an electronic document with a digital 
signature and send it to Bob, she does not have to encrypt the entire 
document with her private key. Instead, she can run the document 
through a one-way hash function, creating a message digest. She can 
then encrypt that message digest using her private key and send it along 
with the unencrypted document. Note that every digital signature is 
unique to the document for which it is created. So a forger could not 
take Alice's digital signature from one document, append it to a 
fraudulent document, and then successfully claim that Alice had signed 
the fraudulent document. 
When Bob receives the message, he independently runs the same one-
way hash function on the original message to determine what the 
message digest should be. He then decrypts ( or "verifies") Alice's 
digital signature, using Alice's public key. If the message digest in 
Alice's decrypted digital signature matches the message digest that Bob 
calculated from the message on his own, then Bob knows that the 
message is indeed from Alice, and that it has not been altered since she 
signed it. If the message digests are not identical, then Bob knows that 
Alice did not sign the same message that he received--somehow the 
message has been altered. If the message digests are identical, Alice 
cannot later successfully claim that she did not send the message. No 
16. RSA FAQ, supra note 7, § 8.2. 
17. Actually, this is not really true, but "the chances of any two messages hashing 
to the same value are minute enough to be negligible." SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY, 
supra note 7, at 60. 
18. Id. at 59. ("[T]here is no way to go backwards with a one-way hash function.") 
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one else could have created the digital signature attached to the 
document. Thus Alice and Bob may have achieved the qualities of data 
origin authentication, message integrity, and non-repudiation. 19 
C. Certificates and Certification Authorities 
Although the procedure followed by Alice and Bob offers the 
possibility of achieving data origin authentication, message integrity, and 
non-repudiation, they did not actually achieve all of these qualities 
because of a fundamental problem in asymmetric cryptosystems: 
identification of the sender. Alice may not have sent the message to 
Bob at all. Instead, a forger may have generated a key pair and entered 
the public key in a public key database under the name "Alice." Bob 
may enter into a business arrangement whereby Bob performs some 
service for the person he believes to be Alice. When Bob later attempts 
to enforce his electronic contract and collect from the real Alice, he will 
find that he has been the victim of fraud. Certificates attempt to solve 
this problem of identification. 
Certificates are digitally-signed electronic documents that attest to the 
connection of a public key to an individual ( or other entity).2° Certifi-
cates are issued by certification authorities (CAs). The process might 
work like this. Alice would generate her public and private key pair.21 
She would then take her public key (on a floppy disk, for example) to 
a CA and present some form of identification. The CA would check the 
identification and take any other steps necessary to assure itself that 
Alice was indeed who she claimed to be. The CA would then give 
l 9. Note that Alice and Bob have not achieved confidentiality, a critical security 
service. While digital signatures utilize public key cryptography, they do not, by 
themselves, provide this quality of confidentiality. Alice can send Bob an unencrypted 
(or "plaintext") message with a digital signature attached. This digital signature can 
prove that the message in fact came from Alice and that the message has not been 
altered. However, someone who intercepted the message could read it, and verify the 
digital signature. 
20. RSA FAQ, supra note 7, § 3.5. 
21. Generating key pairs is not a simple process. One part of the process involves 
generating random numbers. Bruce Schneier notes: "If there is a flaw in the algorithm 
that generates the random numbers, then that flaw might be exploitable by an adversary 
to break the system. This is a tough problem .... Imagine what would happen if the 
program didn't do random-number generation correctly. The program might only 
generate 10 million public-key/private-key pairs. This would be large enough so that no 
two users would have the same key, but small enough for a computer to search them all. 
Even though the program used RSA and DES [two powerful cryptographic algorithms], 
breaking the system would be easy." SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY, supra note 7, at 51. 
Indeed, this problem occurred recently in Netscape's implementation of the RSA 
algorithm in their Navigator World Wide Web browsing software. See Steven Levy, 
Wisecrackers, WIRED, Mar. I 996, at 128, 200. 
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Alice a certificate attesting to the connection between Alice and her 
public key. The certificate would contain Alice's name, her public key, 
and some other information. The certificate would be signed using the 
digital signature of the CA. Thus the certificate could not be altered or 
forged. 
The CA must also somehow prove that it is bound to its public key, 
which is used to verify Alice's certificate. Thus, the CA would have its 
own certificate, signed with the digital signature of a "higher level" 
certification authority. This higher level certification authority might be 
(as under the Utah Act) a government agency.22 
Alice would probably choose to publish this certificate in a publicly-
accessible online database, so that anyone she corresponded with could 
verify her digital signature. Thus, when Bob received a message from 
Alice signed with Alice's digital signature, he could locate Alice's 
certificate in this online database. If the signature on the message could 
be verified using the public key listed in the certificate (and if the CA's 
signature were verified as well), Bob would know that a CA had 
authenticated Alice's identity, and that he was not dealing with someone 
else posing as Alice. 
D. Certificate Revocation 
Certificates are used to address the problem of identification. Public 
key cryptography presents another vexing problem, however: the 
security of private keys. If a forger somehow discovers Alice's private 
key, that forger can digitally sign Alice's name on documents. If a 
forger discovered a certification authority's private key, that forger would 
22. The hierarchy of certification authorities envisioned in the Utah Act is rather 
"flat" compared to other proposed implementations of a public key infrastructure. 
Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM), a draft Internet standard developed by the Privacy and 
Security Research Group of the Internet Activities Board, envisions a certification 
hierarchy with at least one additional tier. Under PEM, the Internet PCA Registration 
Authority (IPRA) serves as the top-level certification authority (the role played by the 
Division under the Utah Act). The IPRA certifies Policy Certification Authorities 
(PCAs), who in tum certify certification authorities (CAs) who meet each PCAs 
particular requirements (different PCAs will have different certification guidelines, i.e., 
some may be "high-assurance," others may be "mid-level assurance," etc.). For a 
general overview of the PEM certification framework, see SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY, 
supra note 7, at 125-27. A more detailed summary of PEM is found in Steven T. Kent, 
Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail, 36:8 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 48 (1993). 
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have the means to commit widespread fraud.23 As a practical matter, 
in any large-scale system utilizing public key cryptography some private 
keys will become compromised, and the certificate containing the 
corresponding public key will need to be revoked. Certificates may have 
to be revoked for other reasons as well.24 Certificate revocation lists 
(CRLs) prevent people from relying on a compromised or otherwise 
revoked public key/private key pair. 
A CRL is a list of public keys that have been revoked prior to their 
expiration date.25 If the private key is compromised, or the key pair is 
no longer in use for some other reason, the public key would be placed 
on a CRL. Thus, before Bob relied on the electronic message that he 
received from Alice, he would check to make sure that Alice's certificate 
was not on a CRL. The online database which published public keys 
would most likely also maintain a CRL.26 
23. See RSA FAQ, supra note 7, § 3.10 ("A compromised CA key is a ... 
dangerous situation. An attacker who discovers a certifying authority's private key can 
issue phony certificates in the name of the certifying authority, which would enable 
undetectable forgeries; for this reason, all precautions must be taken to prevent 
compromise .... "). 
24. For example, a person may be issued a certificate which enables them to 
digitally sign documents on behalf of their employer in the course of their employment. 
If that person leaves their job, their certificate may need to be revoked. 
25. Certificates would generally have expiration dates to ensure that the underlying 
algorithms could not be "broken" by a long term "attack." See RSA FAQ, supra note 
7, § 3. 12. 
26. This Comment does not explore the issue further, but note the privacy 
implications of CRLs. The online database that maintains a CRL will have access to 
valuable transaction-generated information that could expose sensitive relationships 
among individuals or businesses. If Company A sends a digitally signed message to 
Company B, Company B must verify the digital signature by connecting to a database, 
verifying the digital signature and making sure that Company A's certificate is not on 
a certificate revocation list. This process, of course, will leave electronic footprints. 
Could the manager of the database disclose the fact that A and B were corresponding? 
What if A and B were discussing a possible merger or other transaction with significant 
consequences in the securities markets? Similarly, could the database disclose to Joe 
Whistleblower's defense-contractor employer that Whistleblower was verifying digital 
signatures of a reporter from the New York Times? Could the database manager take 
note of the fact that subscriber C frequently corresponded with a cardiologist's office, 
and sell C's name, address, or other personal information to a drug company interested 
in marketing a new drug for heart patients? The Utah Digital Signature Act is totally 
silent on this and other privacy issues. Lawmakers contemplating digital signature 
legislation could look to the Customer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI) 
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 for guidance on how customer 
privacy is protected in an analogous context. See Telecommunication Act of 1996, 104 
Pub. L. No. 104, § 702, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (creating 47 U.S.C. § 221). See also, e.g., 
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE§ 2891 (West Supp. 1996). 
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III. THE UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE ACT 
The Utah Digital Signature Act provides a regulatory scheme for 
licensing CAs and certificate databases (termed "recognized reposito-
ries"), allocates liability and evidentiary burdens among participants in 
the public key infrastructure implemented by the Act, and addresses the 
legal status of electronic documents signed with digital signatures created 
using licensed CAs. The Act is divided into five parts. A part-by-part 
general overview of the Act follows. 27 
Part I of the Utah Act sets out the purposes of the Act, general 
interpretive instructions, a long list of definitions, and guidelines 
concerning the role of the Utah Department of Commerce Division of 
Corporations and Corporate Code ("Division") in implementing the Act. 
The Act states that its goal is to effectuate the following purposes: 
(1) to facilitate commerce by means of reliable electronic messag-
es; 
(2) to minimize the incidence of forged digital signatures and fraud 
in electronic commerce; 
(3) to implement legally the general import of relevant standards, 
such as X.509 of the International Telecommunication Un-
ion28 ... ; and 
( 4) to establish, in coordination with multiple states, uniform rules 
regarding the authentication and reliability of electronic 
messages.29 
After stating the Act's purposes, Part I moves to a comprehensive list 
of definitions. The definitions in the Utah Act largely mirror the 
definitions presented in the Information Security Committee's Digital 
Signature Guidelines,30 and generally promise to be a useful model for 
other legislative efforts, even those that differ from the Utah Act. 
27. Some differences between the amended 1996 version of the Act and the 1995 
original version are noted. At least one state that is contemplating digital signature 
legislation has modeled its proposed statute after the original 1995 version of the Utah 
Act. See 1995 Haw. Sess. Laws 203. 
28. X.509 is a standard format for certificates. It was developed by the 
International Telecommunications Union (then known as the International Consultative 
Committee on Telephony and Telegraphy and abbreviated as "CCITT") in 1988, and 
amendments were proposed in late 1995. See RSA FAQ, supra note 7, § 3.5. 
29. § 46-3-102. 
30. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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Part I also describes the role of the Division, an entity similar to the 
Secretary of State's office in many other states.31 The commentary to 
the relevant provision of the Act describes the Division's role as follows: 
As a certification authority, the Division's role should be limited, in the main, 
to ( 1) spawning other certification authorities, who ... do most of the work of 
issuing certificates to the private sector, (2) enabling licensed certification 
authorities within state government to act as certification authorities, and (3) 
serving users within the Division itself . . . . For the private sector, the 
Division could essentially be a "prime mover" in issuing certificates, issuing 
only as many certificates as needed to start the mainly private-sector digital 
signature infrastructure functioning .... 
The principal role of the Division lies, not in acting as a certification 
authority in its own right, but rather in policy making, facilitating implementa-
tion of digital signature technology as needed, and regulatory oversight.32 
In addition to serving as a top-level certification authority, the Division 
has broad rulemaking authority.33 Among other things, the Division is 
authorized to assure the financial responsibility of CAs by "determin[ing] 
an amount appropriate for a suitable guaranty, in light of: (i) the burden 
a suitable guaranty places upon licensed certification authorities; and (ii) 
the assurance of financial responsibility it provides to persons who rely 
on certificates issued by licensed certification authorities."34 A suitable 
guaranty is either a surety bond or an irrevocable letter of credit that 
meets certain administrative specifications35 and is designed to facilitate 
collection of any judgment obtained against a CA. The Act states that 
"[a] suitable guaranty may also provide that the total annual liability on 
the guaranty to all persons making claims based on it may not exceed 
the face amount of the guaranty."36 Financial institutions acting as 
certification authorities are exempted from the requirement of posting a 
suitable guaranty.37 
In addition to addressing the suitable guaranty issue in rulemaking 
proceedings, the Division is authorized to "review software for use in 
creating digital signatures and publish reports concerning software."38 
The Division is also authorized to make rules concerning the form of 
31. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note I, at 34. 
32. Id. at 36. 
33. § 46-3-104(3). 
34. § 46-3-104(3)(b). 
35. § 46-3-103(33)(a). 
36. § 46-3-103(33)(b). 
37. § 46-3-103(33)(c). 
38. § 46-3-104(3)(c). The 1995 version of the Act empowered the Division to 
"approve asymmetric cryptosystems for use in signing certificates issued by licensed 
certification authorities," and to issue rules addressing the "suitability of algorithms for 
use in fulfilling the requirements of this chapter." 1995 Utah Laws 46-3-501(4), 46-3-
501 (5)(c). 
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certificates, record-keeping requirements for certification authorities, and 
the form and content of certification authority disclosure records 
(publicly-accessible documents which detail certain specified practices 
of certification authorities), and to promulgate other rules necessary to 
effectuate the Act. 39 
Part II of the Act turns to the licensing and regulation of certification 
authorities. The Act sets out minimum qualifications that a certification 
authority must meet in order to obtain a license. Licensing is voluntary; 
unlicensed CAs can operate in the state. Among a number of other 
requirements ( such as providing a suitable guaranty, "employ[ing] as 
operative personnel only persons who have demonstrated knowledge and 
proficiency in following the requirements of this chapter," and being the 
subscriber of a certificate published in a recognized repository), licensed 
certification authorities must "have the right to use a trustworthy system, 
including a secure means for controlling usage of its private key."40 
"Trustworthy system" is defined as computer hardware and software 
which (a) are reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse; (b) provide 
a reasonable level of availability, reliability, and correct operation; and 
(c) are reasonably suited to performing their intended functions. 41 The 
1995 Utah Act limited the availability of certification authority licenses 
to Utah-licensed attorneys, financial institutions, title and escrow 
companies, and certain public entities.42 The 1996 amendments 
dropped these restrictions. 
The Division is empowered to issue restricted licenses under certain 
circumstances.43 The Division may also revoke or suspend a CA's 
39. § 46-3-104(3). 
40. § 46-3-201(1). 
41. § 46-3-103(37). 
42. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-201 (Supp. 1995) (repealed 1996). See also 
Memorandum from Alan Asay to the Digital Signature Legislative Facilitation 
Committee, Aug. 26, 1994 (recommending that licensed CAs be limited to Utah State 
Bar members in good standing or their law firms, financial institutions, insurance 
companies, and title companies, because of the prospect of unscrupulous behavior by a 
CA) (copy on file with author). 
43. The Division may issue restricted licenses classified according to specified 
limitations such as a maximum number of outstanding certificates, cumulative maximum 
of recommended reliance limits in certificates issued by the certification authority, or 
issuance only within a certain firm or organization. § 46-3-201(3). 
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license for failure to comply with the requirements of the Act, including 
failure to maintain the minimum qualifications specified in the Act.44 
The Division may, by administrative rule, recognize CAs licensed or 
authorized by other governmental entities, "provided that those licensing 
or authorization requirements are substantially similar to those of this 
state."45 If the Division recognizes the licensing of a CA by another 
governmental entity, Part IV of the Utah Act (which establishes certain 
presumptions for adjudicating disputes involving digital signatures and 
details the legal effects of digital signatures created through the use of 
licensed CAs) and certain liability limitations granted to licensed CAs in 
Part III of the Act both apply in the same fashion to the out-of-state 
licensed CA as they apply to Utah-licensed certification authorities.46 
These provisions explicitly do not apply to digital signatures created 
using unlicensed CAs.47 
Performance audits are also described in Part II of the Utah Act. 
Licensed CAs are required to have annual performance audits of their 
operations, performed by a certified public accountant having expertise 
in computer security or an accredited computer security professional 
( additional qualifications for auditors may be specified by Division 
rule).48 Exemptions are allowed under certain circumstances.49 
Part II lastly describes the enforcement powers of the Division. The 
Division can investigate the activities of licensed CAs and issue orders 
designed to further its investigation and secure compliance with the 
requirements of the Act. 5° Civil penalties can be assessed for violations 
of the Act committed knowingly or intentionally, up to $5,000 per 
violation or 90% of the "recommended reliance limit" of a material 
44. § 46-3-201 (4). This section requires that revocation or suspension of licensure 
must take place in accordance with the procedures for adjudicative proceedings 
prescribed by Utah's Administrative Procedures Act, codified at UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 63-46b-0.5 to -22 (1993). 
45. § 46-3-201(5). 
46. Id. 
47. § 46-3-201(6). Concerning unlicensed certification authorities, the commentary 
to this portion of the Act notes: 
[A] digital signature may be effective, enforceable, and valid even though it 
is verified only by a certificate issued by an unlicensed certification authority. 
This Act does not preclude the application of other laws for determining what 
constitutes a signature; a mark such as a digital signature may be a valid 
signature under law other than this Act . . . . A certification authority who 
chooses to operate in this state without a license would undertake greater risk 
of liability .... 
UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note I, at 39. 
48. § 46-3-202(1). 
49. § 46-3-202(3). 
50. § 46-3-203(1 ). 
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certificate, whichever is less.51 The Division is also empowered to 
"issue orders and obtain injunctions or other civil relief' against any 
certification authority, licensed or unlicensed, which is conducting its 
business in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of loss to 
subscribers of that certification authority, or to a repository.52 
Part III of the Utah Digital Signature Act turns to the duties of 
certification authorities and subscribers (persons utilizing the services of 
a CA). CAs are required to use trustworthy systems,53 and are required 
to disclose the practices they employ in issuing certificates, upon specific 
request and payment of reasonable compensation. 54 
Prior to issuing a certificate to a subscriber, a certification authority 
must satisfy several conditions. Along with several other technical 
requirements, the Act requires that the CA must confirm that: 
(i) the prospective subscriber is the person to be listed in the 
certificate to be issued; 
(ii) if the prospective subscriber is acting through one or more 
agents, the subscriber authorized the agent or agents to have 
custody of the subscriber's private key; 
(iii) the information in the certificate to be issued is accurate; and 
(iv) the prospective subscriber rightfully holds the private key55 
51. § 46-3-203(3). "Recommended reliance limit" is a monetary amount. § 46-3-
103(28). By specifying a recommended reliance limit is a certificate, the issuing CA and 
the accepting subscriber recommend that persons rely on the certificate only to the extent 
that the total amount at risk does not exceed the recommended reliance limit. § 46-3-
309(1 ). 
52. § 46-3-204(!) and (3). This Comment does not explore the issue further, but 
the grant of authority to act against unlicensed certification authorities is rather 
remarkable. As discussed very briefly in note 14, supra, encryption technology has 
sparked very heated political controversy. One phenomenon that fueled this controversy 
was the release and subsequent widespread adoption of a powerful encryption program, 
"Pretty Good Privacy" (PGP), on the Internet. PGP users act as certification authorities 
for other PGP users, establishing a non-hierarchical "web of trust" certification scheme 
that is very different from the certification hierarchy implemented by the Utah Act. See 
generally SIMSON L. GARFINKEL, PGP: PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY (1995). Use of powerful 
encryption like PGP is generally disfavored by law enforcement officials. Would these 
provisions of the Utah Act allow a zealous official to take legal action against a 
particular PGP user/"certification authority" under the ostensible rationale that PGP's 
"web of trust" certification scheme inherently creates unreasonable risk? 
53. § 46-3-301(1). 
54. § 46-3-301(2). 
55. '"Rightfully hold a private key' means to be able to utilize a private key: (a) 
which the holder or the holder's agents have not disclosed to any person ... ; and (b) 
which the holder has not obtained through theft, deceit, eavesdropping, or other unlawful 
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corresponding to the public key to be listed in the certifi-
cate. 56 
These requirements cannot be waived or disclaimed by either the CA or 
a subscriber. 57 
By issuing a certificate, a CA makes certain warranties to the 
subscriber named in the certificate. These include warranting that the 
certificate contains no information known to the CA to be false, and 
warranting that the certificate "satisfies all material requirements" 
imposed by the Act.58 The CA cannot disclaim or limit these warran-
ties.59 The Act also imposes ongoing obligations to the subscriber on 
the CA, which can be altered by contrary agreement. The CA is 
obligated to promptly suspend or revoke a certificate when specified 
conditions are satisfied, and is obligated to notify the subscriber of any 
facts which significantly affect the validity or reliability of the subscrib-
er's certificate after it is issued.60 By issuing a certificate, a CA 
certifies to all who reasonably rely on it that, among other things, the 
information in the certificate is accurate and that the subscriber has 
accepted the certificate.61 
Accepting a certificate imposes duties on a subscriber. By accepting 
a certificate issued by a licensed CA, a subscriber certifies to all who 
reasonably rely on the certificate that the subscriber rightfully holds the 
private key corresponding to the public key listed in the certificate, and 
that all representations made by the subscriber to the CA or otherwise 
incorporated into the certificate are true.62 Agents or purported agents 
who accept a certificate on behalf of a principal personally certify that 
they have legal authority to act on behalf of the principal, and that 
adequate safeguards exist to prevent the agent from exceeding the 
bounds of any limitations on that agent's ability to sign digitally on 
behalf of the principal.63 Accepting a certificate imposes indemnifica-
tion obligations on a subscriber: 
By accepting a certificate, a subscriber undertakes to indemnify the issuing 
certification authority for any loss or damage caused by issuance or publication 
of a certificate in reliance on: 
(a) a false and material representation of fact by the subscriber; or 
(b) the failure of the subscriber to disclose a material fact; 
means."§ 46-3-103(31). 
56. § 46-3-302(l)(b). 
57. § 46-3-302(l)(c). 
58. § 46-3-303(l)(a) and (b). 
59. § 46-3-303(1). 
60. § 46-3-303(2). 
61. § 46-3-303(4). 
62. § 46-3-304(1 ). 
63. § 46-3-304(2). 
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if the representation or failure to disclose was made either with intent to 
deceive the certification authority or a person relying on a certificate, or 
with negligence. . . . The indemnity provided in this subsection may not 
be disclaimed or contractually limited in scope .... 64 
By accepting a certificate, a subscriber assumes a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to retain control of the private key corresponding to the 
public key listed in the certificate, and to prevent its disclosure to any 
person not authorized to create the subscriber's digital signature. 65 A 
private key is deemed to be the personal property of the subscriber who 
rightfully holds it.66 A CA who holds a subscriber's private key does 
so as a fiduciary, and may use the private key only with the subscriber's 
express permission.67 
CAs are required to publish certificates which they have issued in a 
recognized repository68 unless a contract between a subscriber and the 
CA provides otherwise.69 After issuing a certificate, a CA can suspend 
or revoke it under certain conditions, including upon the subscriber's 
request.70 Likewise, the Division can order a CA to revoke or suspend 
a certificate if certain conditions are met, including compliance with the 
Administrative Procedures Act by the Division.71 Notice of suspension 
or revocation must be "immediately" published in a recognized 
repository specified in the certificate.72 While a particular certificate 
is suspended, a subscriber is released from the duty to keep the relevant 
private key secure. 73 Upon notice of revocation, a subscriber is 
64. § 46-3-304(4). 
65. § 46-3-305( 1 ). The commentary to this portion of the Utah Act offers three 
alternative standards of care for holders of private keys: strict liability, diligence, and 
"negligence for consumers; diligence for others." UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra 
note I, at 50. Some of the drafters of the Utah Act originally advocated a strict liability 
standard for breach of the duty to safeguard a subscriber's private key. See Memorandum 
from Alan Asay to the Digital Signature Legislative Facilitation Committee, Aug. 24, 
1994 (recommending strict liability standard) (copy on file with author). 
66. § 46-3-305(2). 
67. § 46-3-305(3). 
68. Repositories are on-line databases of certificates available for retrieval and use 
in verifying digital signatures. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note I, at 13. 
Recognized repositories are repositories recognized by the Division pursuant to § 46-3-
501. § 46-3-103(27). 
69. § 46-3-302(2). 
70. §§ 46-3-302(4), -306, -307. 
71. § 46-3-302(5). 
72. §§ 46-3-306(3), -307(5). 
73. § 46-3-306(7). 
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released from the duty to keep the private key secure and from the other 
duties imposed by the acceptance of a certificate.74 Revocation also 
releases a CA from its warranties and representations.75 These duties 
are also discharged upon the expiration of a certificate; all certificates 
are required to have an expiration date.76 
Liability limits for licensed CAs are detailed. The Act provides that, 
unless waived by the CA, a CA shall: 
(a) not be liable for any loss caused by reliance on a false or forged digital 
signature of a subscriber, if, with respect to the false or forged digital 
signature, the certification authority complied with all material 
requirements of [the Act]; 
(b) not be liable in excess of the amount specified in the certificate as its 
recommended reliance limit for either: 
(i) a loss caused by reliance on a misrepresentation in the 
certificate of any fact that the licensed certification authority 
is required to confirm; or 
(ii) failure to comply with section 30277 in issuing the certificate; 
( c) be liable only for direct, compensatory damages in any action to 
recover a loss due to reliance on the certificate. Direct compensatory 
damages do not include: 
(i) punitive or exemplary damages; 
(ii) damages for lost profits, savings\ or opportunity; or 
(iii) damages for pain and suffering.' 
Part III lastly provides rules for collection upon a suitable guaranty. 
A claimant may recover the full amount of a "qualified right to 
payment" against the surety bond or letter of credit serving as the 
suitable guaranty. 79 A qualified right to payment means an award of 
damages against a licensed CA by a court having jurisdiction over the 
CA in a civil action for violation of the Act.80 In addition to the 
amount of the qualified right to payment, a claimant can recover 
reasonable attorney's fees and court costs from the suitable guaranty.81 
The total liability on the suitable guaranty to all persons making 
qualified rights of payment or recovering attorney's fees during its term 
cannot exceed the amount of the suitable guaranty.82 Interpleader 
techniques will assist in equitably distributing the proceeds of a suitable 
74. § 46-3-307(6). 
75. § 46-3-307(7). 
76. § 46-3-308(1) to (2). 
77. § 46-3-302 details the requirements that must be met prior to a CA issuing a 
certificate to a subscriber. 
78. § 46-3-309(2). 
79. § 46-3-310(1). 
80. § 46-3-103(25). 
81. § 46-3-310(2). 
82. § 46-3-310(1) to 46-3-310(2). 
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guaranty to multiple claimants whose claims exceed the amount of the 
guaranty.83 
Part IV of the Act addresses the effect of a digital signature. A digital 
signature is deemed to satisfy legal signature requirements if: 
( 1) that digital signature is verified by reference to the public key listed 
in a valid certificate issued by a licensed certification authority; 
(2) that digital signature was affixed by the signer with the intention of 
signing the message; and 
(3) the recipient has no knowledge or notice that the signer either: 
(a) breached a duty as a subscriber; or 
(b) does not rightfull.( hold the private key used to affix the 
digital signature. 8 
Language in the Act and in the accompanying commentary emphasizes 
that the Act is not designed to preclude other symbols or marks from 
being valid as a signature under other applicable law. "An unverified 
digital signature or other symbol may be treated as a signature, if, in the 
words of the Uniform Commercial Code§ 1-201(39), it is 'executed or 
adopted by a party with the present intention to authenticate a writ-
ing. "'85 The Act is designed to "appl[y] only to the digital signatures 
described within it, and ... simply does not pertain to the validity of 
other symbols as signatures."86 
If reliance on a digital signature is "not reasonable under the 
circumstances," the recipient of that digital signature assumes the risk 
that digital signature is forged.87 A recipient of a digital signature can 
determine not to rely on an unreliable signature and must promptly 
notify the signer of that decision. 88 
The Act states that electronic documents signed with a valid digital 
signature created using a licensed CA are "written" as required by the 
statute of frauds.89 Additionally, a copy of a digitally signed message 
is "as effective, valid, and enforceable as the original of the message," 
thus satisfying the best evidence rule.90 
83. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note 1, at 60. 
84. § 46-3-401. 
85. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note 1, at 61. 
86. Id. 
87. § 46-3-402. 
88. § 46-3-402. 
89. § 46-3-403; UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note 1, at 64. 
90. § 46-3-404. This section contains an exception for originals intended to be 
unique, such as negotiable instruments. See UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note 
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The Act provides that a certificate issued by a licensed CA is an 
acknowledgment of a digital signature verified by reference to the public 
key listed in the certificate.91 Thus, among other things, digitally 
signed documents are deemed to be "acknowledged" and self-authenti-
cating and are therefore prima facie admissible evidence under rule 
902(8) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (identical to rule 902(8) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence).92 
Presumptions for adjudicating disputes are set out in the Act as 
follows: 
In adjudicating a dispute involving a digital signature, a court of this state 
shall presume that: 
(I) A certificate digitally signed by a licensed certification authority and 
either published in a recognized repository or made available by the 
issuing certification authority or by the subscriber listed in the 
certificate is issued by the certification authority which digitally signed 
it and is accepted by the subscriber listed in it; 
(2) The information listed in a valid certificate ... and confirmed by a 
licensed certification authority issuing the certificate is accurate; 
(3) If a digital signature is verified by the public key listed in a valid 
certificate issued by a licensed certification authority: 
(a) that digital signature is the digital signature of the subscrib-
er listed in that certificate; 
(b) that digital signature was affixed by the signer" with the 
intention of signing the message; and 
( c) the recipient of that digital signature has no knowledge or 
notice that the signer: 
(i) breached a duty as a subscriber; or 
(ii) does not rightfully hold the private key used to 
affix the digital signature; and 
( 4) A digital signature was created before it was timestamped by a 
disinterested person utilizing a trustworthy system.94 
The commentary to this section of the Act claims that "[t]he effect of the 
presumptions provided in this section is merely to allocate the burden of 
1, at 65. 
91. § 46-3-405. 
92. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note !, at 66-67. 
93. As drafted by Utah Digital Signature Legislative Facilitation Committee the 
1996 amendments to the Utah Act used the words "that subscriber" rather than "the 
signer." See UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note 1, at 68. Presumably the Utah 
legislature did not intend to substantively alter the meaning of this section by this 
eleventh-hour change (an assumption that is buttressed by reading subsection 3(b) in 
conjunction with subsection 3(a)). Rather, the legislature probably made the change in 
order to echo the language in § 46-3-401, which establishes the legal status of digital 
signatures. At least one other state that has followed the Utah Act model has retained 
the original language, "that subscriber." See S. 6423, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 406 
(Wash. 1995). 
94. § 46-3-406. 
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going forward with allegations and evidence to the party challenging the 
digital signature, the certificate, or the trustworthy time-stamp. "95 
Part V of the Act concerns repositories. The Division is required to 
recognize one or more repositories.96 A recognized repository must be 
operated by a licensed CA and provide access to a database containing 
certificates published by the repository, notices of suspended or revoked 
certificates, certification authority disclosure records for licensed CAs, 
and other information specified by the Division.97 Procedures for 
recognition of repositories are set out in the Act98 and in accompanying 
regulations.99 
The liability of recognized repositories is limited by the Act. Unless 
waived, a recognized repository, or the owner or operator of a recog-
nized repository, is not liable for failure to record suspension or 
revocation of a certificate unless more than one business day elapsed 
after notice was received.100 However, the repository may be held 
liable for any loss of a person who relied on a revoked or suspended 
certificate----up to the amount of the recommended reliance limit on the 
relevant certificate and including only direct compensatory damages and 
not punitive damages or lost profits, savings, or opportunity-if the 
repository failed to publish notice of suspension or revocation of a 
certificate more than one business day after receiving notice. 101 
Repositories are not liable for misrepresentation in a certificate published 
by a licensed certification authority. 102 Nor are they liable for publish-
ing information which the Division requires them to publish. 103 
95. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note l, at 69. As discussed in Section 
V of this Comment, however, the Act may impose a greater evidentiary burden than 
suggested in the commentary. A time-stamp is a digitally-signed notation appended or 
attached to a message which indicates, at least, the date and time when the notation was 
created and the identity of the person creating the notation. § 46-3-103(36). Reliable 
time-stamps are essential to maintain the validity of electronic documents over many 
years. RSA FAQ, supra note 7, § 3.18. 
96. § 46-3-501 (2). 
97. §§ 46-3-501(2)(a) to -501(2)(b). 
98. § 46-3-501(2). 
99. UTAH ADMIN. R. 146-10-401 (1996). 
100. § 46-3-502(2)(a). 
101. § 46-3-502( 1) - (2). 
102. § 46-3-502(2)(a)(iii)). 
103. § 46-3-502(2)(a)(v). 
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IV. THE UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE ACT AS 
PUTATIVE "MODEL ACT" 
The Utah Digital Signature Act was developed in collaboration with 
the Information Security Committee of the Section of Science and 
Technology of the American Bar Association (the "Information Security 
Committee"). 104 The Information Security Committee, which endorsed 
the Utah Act "in principle,"105 planned to release a Model Digital 
Signature Act in June of 1995.106 The release of this draft model 
legislation has been delayed indefinitely. One report credits "bureaucrat-
ic maneuvering" for the delay, describing the frustration of Information 
Security Committee members over the postponement of the release of 
their Model Act. 107 The Information Security Committee had been 
developing model legislation for three years. Committee member's 
frustration reportedly was compounded by the specter of rapidly 
accelerating state legislative activity concerning digital signatures, 
proceeding without the guidance of the Information Security Committee's 
model legislation. 108 
In the absence of model legislation from the Information Security 
Committee, a number of states turned to the Utah Act as model digital 
signature legislation, a process encouraged by the drafters of the Utah 
legislation. 109 In several public communications, a prominent Informa-
104. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note I, at 18. 
I 05. Resolution of the Information Security Committee, Section of Science and 
Technology, American Bar Association (November 9, 1994) (copy on file with author). 
I 06. E-mail message from Michael S. Baum, Chair of the Information Security 
Committee, Section of Science and Technology, American Bar Association, to the <ca-
digsig@commerce.net> Internet mailing list (May 6, 1995) (printed copy on file with 
author). 
I 07. Digital Signature Maven Bye Bye Baum ABA EDI and Information Technology 
Division Head Resigns, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP., Oct. 13, 1995, available in 
LEXIS, MARKET Library, IACNWS File ("the ABA's work at providing states with a 
draft bill has been stymied by bureaucratic maneuvering"). 
I 08. ABA Model Law on Digital Signature on Hold, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES 
REP., Sept. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, MARKET Library, IACNWS File ("The delay 
has angered some members of the Information Security Committee who fear that state 
legislative action is moving too fast for the ABA to have much influence."); 
109. See, e.g.,§ 46-3-102(4) (one of the purposes of the Utah Act is to establish, 
in coordination with other states, uniform rules for digital signatures). See also UTAH 
DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note I, at 25 (noting that one of the purposes for 
publishing the commentary is to provide guidance for other states considering digital 
signature legislation). The Utah Department of Commerce, Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code formed an "interjurisdictional group" which held at least one 
"discussion meeting." Among the suggested topics at this meeting was "What should we 
do to facilitate this new approach to commerce?" Proposed Agenda for Discussion 
Meeting on Interstate Cooperation Regarding Digital Signatures (undated) (copy on file 
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tion Security Committee member who was also involved in the drafting 
of the Utah Act indicated that the "U.S. Model Digital Signature Act" 
under development by the Information Security Committee was 
substantively identical to the Utah Digital Signature Act. 110 At its 
September 19, 1995 meeting, the Utah's Digital Signature Legislative 
Facilitation Committee, the ad hoc committee which drafted the Utah 
Act, discussed the delay in the release of the Information Security 
Committee's Model Act. The minutes of the meeting note that, "despite 
efforts by the ABA or NCCUSL, 111 the perception held by many states 
is that Utah's Act is the Model Act. Therefore, it was determined that 
Utah's interest, and the interests of other jurisdictions, require amending 
the Utah Act in conformity with the work of the ABA Committee."112 
The explanation for the delay of the Information Security Committee's 
model legislation appears to be more complex than simply "bureaucratic 
maneuvering," and the picture painted by the proponents of the Utah Act 
as a model act may be misleading. One Committee member has 
indicated that the primary reason for the lack of a legislative recommen-
dation from the Information Security Committee was that a "majority" 
of the committee believed "digital signature legislation like Utah's is 
with author); Letter from George Danielson, Digital Signature Coordinator, Utah 
Department of Commerce, to C. Bradford Biddle (February 14, 1996) ( describing this 
group as the "interjurisdictional group") (on file with author). See also § 46-3-201(5) 
(providing that the Utah Department of Commerce Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code can recognize certification authorities licensed or authorized by 
another state if the licensing or authorization requirements of the other state are 
"substantially similar" to those of Utah). 
110. Alan Asay was the principal drafter of the Utah Act and also served as a 
Reporter for the Information Security Committee's effort. In an e-mail message to Barry 
Fraser of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Asay wrote: "The Act adopted in Utah and 
under consideration in other states is about to be published, with some revision and for 
comment, as the Model Digital Signature Act by the American Bar Association's 
Information Security Committee." E-mail message from Alan Asay (April 29, 1995) 
(printed copy on file with author). In an e-mail message to the "ca-digsig" mailing list, 
Asay wrote that he expected the proposed amendments to the Utah Act (since enacted) 
to "largely if not entirely conform the Act as it now stands to the ABA ISC's US Model 
Digital Signature Act." E-mail message from Alan Asay to the <ca-
digsig@commerce.net> mailing list (May 6, 1995) (printed copy on file with author.) 
111. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See infra note 
I 14. 
112. Minutes of the Utah Digital Signatures [sic] Act, Legislation Facilitation 
Committee (September 19, 1995) (on file with author). 
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simply unnecessary."113 Michael Baum, Chair of the Information 
Security Committee, has noted that the committee's decision not to 
proceed with model legislation was the result of a number of legitimate 
factors, including "a probable lack of consensus [among committee 
members] on a single legislative approach .... " 114 
In spite of some resistance to the Utah approach within the Informa-
tion Security Committee and elsewhere, a number of states are moving 
forward with digital signature legislation modeled upon the Utah Act. 
By April of 1996, at least nine states had passed or had actively 
considered digital signature legislation. 115 Five of these states (Arizo-
na, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan, and Washington) were considering or 
had enacted bills directly modeled after the Utah Act.116 California 
enacted a different, narrower form of digital signature legislation in 
1995, and a bill modeled after this legislation was introduced in Rhode 
Island in 1996. Legislation in Floridall7 and Virginia focused primari-
ly on studying the issue of digital signature legislation and reporting 
findings to the legislature. 
On October 5, 1995, the Information Security Committee released an 
exposure draft of its Digital Signature Guidelines, which it described as 
"general, abstract statements of principle, intended to serve as long-term, 
113. E-mail message from Peter N. Weiss, Information Security Committee member, 
to C. Bradford Biddle (Febmary 23, 1996) (printed copy on file with author). 
114. E-mail message from Michael Baum to the <ca-digsig@commerce.net> mailing 
list (Febmary 21, 1996) (printed copy on file with author). Baum's message noted that 
our decision not to proceed with model legislation was the result of many 
legitimate factors, including (l) notice from the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to our section that they are considering 
the possibility of drafting model legislation (and the ABA's agreement with the 
Commissioners to coordinate such matters), (2) the fact that our committee has 
not yet had the time to rigorously consider and debate legislative issues and 
approaches ... , (3) our committee's legitimate focus on the completion of the 
draft Digital Signature Guidelines (the current focus of considerable effort), 
and (4) a probable lack of consensus on a single legislative approach at this 
time. 
115. See H.R. 2444, 42nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1996); A. 1577, ch. 594 (Cal. 
I 995); H.R. l 023 (Fla. 1996); S. 942 (Fla. 1996); S. 736, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1995); H.R. 
1256, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1995); S.R. 621, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1995); S. 2401, 18th Leg. (Haw. 
1995); S. 939, 1996 Sess. (Mich. 1995); G.A. 8125, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1995); H.R.J. Res. 
195 (Va. 1996); S. 5959, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995); S. 6423, 54th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Wash. 1995). 
116. Washington enacted 1995 Senate Bill 6423 on March 29, 1996. 1995 
Washington Senate Bill 5959 died. The Oregon legislation died in committee in 1995. 
1996 Arizona House Bill 2444 was enacted on April 18, 1996, but amendments caused 
it to no longer follow the Utah model. 1995 Georgia Senate Bill 736 died in committee 
on March 8, 1996. 1995 Hawaii Senate Bill 2401 was enacted on June 17, 1996. The 
other legislation was pending as of this writing. 
117. Florida enacted digital signature legislation that differs both from the Utah 
model and from California's approach on May 25, 1996. S. 942 (Fla. 1996). 
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unifying foundations for digital signature law across varying legal 
settings."118 The Guidelines, while comprehensive, are not intended 
to serve as model legislation, and they avoid taking positions on many 
critical issues that legislation in this area must address. 119 
V. CRITICISM OF THE UTAH ACT 
The remainder of this Comment focuses on one problem area for the 
Utah Digital Signature Act: the allocation of liability and evidentiary 
burdens. 120 Under the Utah Digital Signature Act, users of digital 
118. INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITTEE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIGITAL 
SIGNATURE GUIDELINES 20 (Draft, October 5, 1995) [Hereinafter DRAFT DIGITAL 
SIGNATURE GUIDELINES]. On August I, I 996 the Information Security Committee 
released the final version of these guidelines. INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITTEE, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES: LEGAL INFRASTRUC-
TURE FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES AND SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1996). 
119. See, e.g., DRAFT DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note I 18, § 4.3.2 
(noting that the Guidelines are "intentionally silent" on the duty of care required of 
holders of private keys). 
120. There are many other aspects of the Utah Act that deserve critical analysis but 
will not be discussed here. A thoughtful criticism of public key cryptography generally 
can be found in WRIGHT, supra note 3, § ETl.2. The provisions of the Act relating to 
the legal status of electronic documents have been criticized as unnecessary and 
potentially dangerous, in that they arguably unsettle what is already a fairly well-settled 
body of law. See generally Peter N. Weiss, Security Requirements and Evidentiary Issues 
in the Interchange of Electronic Documents: Steps Toward Developing a Security Policy, 
I 2 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 425 ( I 993) (arguing that current law can 
accommodate electronic documents created and maintained in adequately secure 
environments). The costs associated with legislative endorsement of one particular 
technology (public-key encryption technology, or, more narrowly, specific implementa-
tions of this technology) and whether this endorsement will affect the development of 
alternative solutions to the problems posed by communications over open computer 
networks deserve consideration. A wide variety of approaches to electronic commerce 
have developed without government intervention; perhaps current law and market forces 
can solve the problems posed by the Internet without ambitious new legislation. See, e.g., 
WRIGHT, supra note 3, § ET! .3.2 (describing the online payment system of First Virtual 
Holdings, Inc.), § ET3. l (describing Mondex electronic cash), § ET3.2 (describing First 
Bank of the Internet), and Appendix G (describing the Pen-Op system of capturing 
handwritten signatures electronically). See also The Quick Tour; A Summary of 
Approaches; Electronic Commerce Industry Overview, RELEASE 1.0, Jan. 24, I 995, at 
6. There are other cost-related issues: the institutional overhead associated with creating 
and maintaining the Act's infrastructure will be passed along to participants, and 
participants must have access to expensive computer hardware and software in order to 
participate in the system. The Utah Act does not address the question of whether 
citizens who are unable to afford these costs should be provided with subsidized or 
reduced-cost access to the infrastructure. Universal service provisions in telecommunica-
tions law may prove instructive. 
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signatures are held to a standard of reasonable care in preventing 
disclosure of their private encryption key. 121 In contrast to the careful-
ly articulated duties the Act requires of certification authorities, the Utah 
Act is virtually silent when it comes to determining what constitutes 
reasonable care on the part of subscribers in safeguarding their private 
keys. Thus, this issue of what constitutes reasonable care will be shaped 
by the expensive and often inelegant process of court decisions gradually 
determining a standard. In the long run, a sensible, workable standard 
may emerge from this process. In the meantime, however, this lack of 
a clear standard could lead to inconsistent decisions by courts struggling 
to understand a complex, emerging technology, and lead to inequitable 
results for those unable to marshal the considerable resources necessary 
to make complicated, technology-based arguments before a tribunal 
which may be ill-equipped to understand the relevant issues. 
The problems with the ill-defined standard of care imposed on 
subscribers in safeguarding private keys are compounded by the 
evidentiary presumptions imposed by the Utah Act. In adjudicating 
disputes involving digital signatures, the Utah Act instructs courts to 
presume (among other things) that if a digital signature is verified by the 
public key listed in a valid certificate issued by a licensed certification 
authority, (i) the subscriber has accepted the corresponding certificate 
(and thus assumed the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the 
relevant private key), (ii) the digital signature is the digital signature of 
the subscriber listed in the certificate, and (iii) the digital signature was 
affixed with the intention of signing the message. 122 Thus, if a 
subscriber is defrauded by a criminal who somehow obtains that 
subscriber's private key and uses it to commit fraud, the subscriber must 
come to court with evidence which rebuts this presumption. That is, the 
subscriber challenging a fraudulent digital signature must come to court 
with evidence showing that they in fact did not affix the digital signature 
in question, and that they exercised reasonable care in protecting their 
private key. Moreover, it appears that under Utah law this presumption 
shifts to the subscriber not only the burden of producing prima facie 
evidence to rebut the presumption, but also the burden of persuading the 
finder of fact that the presumed facts are not true. 123 Indeed, because 
121. § 46-3-305(1). 
122. § 46-3-406(3). 
123. Utah law distinguishes between presumptions which shift the burden of 
persuasion on an issue and those which shift only the burden of making a prima facie 
case on the matter. See, e.g., In re Swan's Estate, 293 P.2d 682 (Utah 1956) (some 
presumptions are not eliminated upon the introduction of prima facie evidence but have 
the effect of placing on the disfavored party the burden of persuading the factfinder that 
the facts are contrary to the presumed facts). See generally William E. Shipley, 
1168 
[VOL. 33: 1143, 1996] Misplaced Priorities 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
digitally signed documents are considered acknowledged documents 
under the Utah Act, the burden may be an onerous one. Clear and 
convincing evidence is generally required of the party asserting the 
invalidity of an acknowledgment; a mere preponderance of the evidence 
is not sufficient. 124 
To illustrate the difficulties that the allocations of liability and 
evidentiary burdens under the Utah Act pose for subscribers who utilize 
digital signatures under the Act, consider the following hypothetical, 
adapted from an example provided by the drafters of the Utah Act: 125 
Cedric, a licensed certification authority, duly issues a certificate to Susan, 
who accepts it. Cedric publishes the certificate in a recognized repository. 
Susan's private key, which corresponds to the public key in the certificate, is 
kept on a floppy disk. Irving, a malicious computer hacker, releases a computer 
virus on the Internet that finds its way onto Susan's computer. Subsequently 
when Susan uses her private key, the virus program surreptitiously sends a copy 
of Susan's private key to Irving. Irving immediately uses the private key to 
cash a $ I 0,000 electronic check drawn upon Susan's account payable to a 
numbered, anonymous account in a state having rigorous bank secrecy laws. 
Irving disappears and cannot be found. As soon as Susan learns of the fraud 
she revokes her certificate. 
Annotation, Effect of Presumption as Evidence or Upon Burden of Proof. Where 
Controverting Evidence is Introduced, 5 A.L.R.3d 19 (1966). Whether or not a 
presumption falls into one category or another is a complicated question of law, and an 
analysis of whether the presumptions of the Utah Act would, by themselves, shift the 
evidentiary burden will not be attempted here. The issue is likely moot because of the 
"acknowledged document" status the Utah Act provides digitally-signed documents. 
Regardless of whether the presumptions alone would shift the evidentiary burden to a 
subscriber, because digitally-signed documents are acknowledged under the Utah Act a 
subscriber attacking the validity of a digitally-signed document bears a substantial 
evidentiary burden. See note 124, infra, and accompanying text. 
124. I AM. JUR. 2D Acknowledgments § 84 ( 1994 ). This issue is discussed in Part 
V(B), infra. 
125. Adapted from an illustration provided in UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, 
supra note I, at 91-92. The illustration provided therein had Irving stealing a floppy 
disk containing Susan's private key from Susan's purse. It is interesting to note that none 
of the illustrations provided by the drafters of the Utah Act include the scenario where 
a private key is captured by a computer virus, even though the Digital Signature 
Legislative Facilitation Committee considered this possibility. In a memo to the 
Committee, Alan Asay wrote, in the context of discussing a CA's private key: "if the 
certification authority's system security has been breached without the certification 
authority's knowledge (such as by a virus that has compromised the certification 
authority's private key), the certification authority must revoke." Memorandum from 
Alan Asay to the Digital Signature Legislative Facilitation Committee, Sept. 23, 1994 
( copy on file with author.) 
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According to the analysis of this scenario provided by the drafters of the 
Utah Act, under the Act Susan will be liable for the loss caused by the 
forgery if she failed to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding her 
private key. 126 The Act provides no guidance as to whether the failure 
to protect one's computer from a virus constitutes a breach of the duty 
of reasonable care. Thus, Susan must obtain the services of an attorney 
well-versed in computer technology and go to court. Susan must 
overcome the presumption that the electronic check signed with her 
digital signature is valid and binding upon her. The electronic check 
will have the status of an acknowledged document, so clear and 
convincing evidence is required to challenge its validity. Susan must 
show that in fact she did not affix the digital signature in question. 
Furthermore, she must show that she did not breach her duty of care in 
allowing Irving, the criminal, to obtain her private key. If Susan is 
unsuccessful after this time-consuming and expensive process, then 
Susan will bear the $10,000 loss. 
The allocations of liability and evidentiary burdens imposed by the 
Utah Act put users of digital signatures who are victimized by fraud in 
a position that is disadvantageous compared to several analogous 
situations. Consumers who participate in the infrastructure developed 
under the Utah Act subject themselves to a far greater risk of liability 
than they face in other electronic transactions, such as credit card or 
debit card transactions. The liability allocations and evidentiary burdens 
of the Utah Act contradict the spirit, and in certain circumstances (such 
as the example of Susan and Irving, supra) the letter, of consumer-
protection statutes such as the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA)127 
and the Truth in Lending Act. 128 Moreover, a defrauded consumer 
challenging the practice of a certification authority in court faces more 
difficult evidentiary burdens than a defrauded consumer challenging the 
practice of a notary. The liability allocations and burdens of proof 
imposed by the Utah Act most closely resemble the law relating to 
telecommunications "toll fraud," which itself has been highly controver-
sial. A comparison follows of the liability provisions of the Utah Act 
to these three analogous models, the "credit card model," the "notary 
model," and the "toll fraud model." Proposed reforms in the arena of 
toll fraud suggest an alternative liability allocation scheme that would 
more effectively protect the interests of all participants in a public key 
126. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note I, at 92. 
127. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1994). 
128. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1994). 
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system and promote the development of a robust public key infrastruc-
ture. 129 
A. The "Credit Card Model" 
A comparison of the liability allocations and evidentiary burdens of 
the Utah Act to the liability provisions of two federal consumer 
protection statutes, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and the Truth in 
Lending Act, proves instructive. The virtually identical liability schemes 
of these two Acts will be termed the "credit card model," at the risk of 
being somewhat misleading. The combined scope of these two Acts is 
much broader than just credit card transactions, but for the purposes of 
comparison with the Utah Act, the focus will be on the provisions of 
these Acts which address consumer liability in credit card-like electronic 
transactions. An analysis of this legislation demonstrates, first, that 
some transactions using digital signatures will fall under the purview of 
at least the EFTA, and the liability scheme of the Utah Act will be 
preempted for a certain narrow class of transactions. More broadly, the 
I 29. The potential magnitude of the fraud problem in the context of a public key 
infrastructure is completely unknown. In other contexts the fraud problem is enormous. 
In 1994 Mastercard reported a loss of $486 million due to credit card fraud; Visa's fraud 
loss was $645 million. Robert Jennings, Fraud is Stealing Holiday Joy from Credit Card 
Companies, AM. BANKER, Dec. 7, 1995, at I. The number of consumers who are 
victims of "true name fraud" or "identity theft" has been skyrocketing. In I 993, the 
credit reporting agency Trans-Union received an average of 300 calls per month to their 
fraud line set up for victimized consumers; by February of 1996 they were receiving 
I 200 calls per day. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 25, I 996). According 
to AT&T, telecommunications toll fraud costs American businesses $2 billion annually. 
Carriers, PBX Makers, Customers Debate Toll Fraud Responsibility, REP. ON AT&T, 
Feb. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ZTLI File. Phone companies 
estimate that they lose about $3 billion to calling card fraud and other types of fraud. 
Peter Sinton, Visa Has Sights Set on Credit Card Fraud, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 14, 1994, 
at BI. Interestingly, the preventative efforts of at least one group of telecommunications 
companies, the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) or "Baby Bells," have 
been directed "almost exclusively" at calling card fraud, even though this type of fraud 
represents only I 2 percent to I 5 percent of overall phone fraud. Local Te/cos Slow 
Joining Industry Fight Against Phone Fraud, TELCO Bus. REP., May 22, 1995, available 
in LEXIS, NEWS Library, NWLTRS File. See also Local Phone Companies Found to 
be Apathetic Toward Security, 12 COMM. DAILY I, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, 
NWLTRS File. As mentioned in note 132, infra, under the Truth in Lending Act, 
consumer liability for calling card fraud is generally capped at $50, and thus the RBOCs 
bear a substantial portion of the losses caused by calling card fraud. However, 
customers are strictly liable for other types of telecommunications fraud, as discussed 
in Part V(C), infra, and the RBOCs bear virtually no risk of loss for this kind of fraud. 
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EFTA and the Truth in Lending Act demonstrate a strong federal policy 
in favor of consumer protection which the Utah Act simply ignores. 
This analysis is not intended to assert that the liability allocations of the 
EFTA and Truth in Lending Act necessarily should govern in a public 
key infrastructure. Indeed, as explored further below, some differences 
exist between the credit card model and a public key infrastructure 
which may justify different liability rules. 
Certain transactions utilizing digital signatures will likely be governed 
by the liability rules of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act. Consumers' 
rights in this class of transactions contrast sharply with the rights that the 
Utah Act provides to consumers in transactions that are not preempted 
by the EFTA. To illustrate the potential applicability of the EFTA to 
transactions utilizing digital signatures, reconsider the hypothetical 
involving Susan and Irving, introduced supra. According to the analysis 
provided by the drafters of the Utah Act, Susan will likely be liable for 
the loss caused by the forgery if she failed to exercise reasonable care 
in safeguarding her private key. While this may be true as far as the 
Utah Act goes, this analysis fails to consider the applicability of the 
EFTA, which, under this scenario, would likely preempt the Utah Act 
and limit Susan's liability to $50 and impose the bulk of the loss upon 
the financial institution, as well as shift the burden of proof in any 
dispute away from Susan and onto the financial institution. 
The EFTA was enacted for the purpose of providing a basic frame-
work establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants 
in electronic fund transfer systems, and its primary objective is the 
provision of individual consumer rights. 130 Electronic fund transfer is 
defined in the EFTA as "any transfer of funds, other than a transaction 
originated by check, draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated 
through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, or computer ... 
so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit or 
credit an account."rn The EFTA limits a consumer's liability for 
unauthorized electronic fund transfers to, in most cases, $50. 132 The 
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(b) (1994). See also 12 C.F.R. § 205.l(b) (1996). The 
purposes of the EFT A are to be carried out by regulations prescribed by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(a) (1994). The 
regulations adopted by the Board are known as "Regulation E" and are found at 12 CFR 
205.1 to .14 (1996). 
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (1994). 
132. A consumer's liability for an unauthorized electronic fund transfer is capped 
at the lesser of $50 or the aggregate amount of unauthorized transfers occurring prior 
to the time that the consumer gives notice to the financial institution, unless the 
consumer I) fails to report unauthorized transfers appearing on a periodic statement 
within 60 days (absent extenuating circumstances), or 2) fails to report loss or theft of 
a card or other means of account access within two business days (absent extenuating 
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liability limits of the EFTA apply if the "access device used for the 
unauthorized electronic funds transfer is an accepted access device."133 
An "access device" is defined as a "card, code, or other means of access 
to a consumers account, or any combination thereof, that may be used 
by the consumer for the purpose of initiating electronic funds trans-
fers."134 It is an "accepted access device" when the consumer to 
whom the access device was issued "[r]equests and receives ... or uses 
... the access device for the purpose of transferring money between 
accounts or obtaining money, property, labor, or services."135 In any 
action which involves a consumer's liability for an unauthorized fund 
transfer, the burden of proof is on the financial institution to establish 
that the conditions set forth in the EFTA, which allow application of the 
EFTA's liability provisions, are met.136 
The applicability of the EFTA in the Susan/Irving scenario may tum 
upon the question of whether the technology used to affix a digital 
signature constitutes an "access device." Significantly, the Information 
Security Committee's Digital Signature Guidelines assert that it does not: 
A private key, as defined in these Guidelines, is not an "access device" within 
the meaning of 12 C.F.R. § 205(2)(a)(l) (1994) (Regulation E of the Board of 
circumstances), in which case liability is capped at the lesser of $500 or the amount of 
actual loss. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (1994). The provisions in the Truth in Lending Act that 
concern credit cards address liability issues in largely the same fashion. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1643 ( 1994 ). The EFT A was strongly influenced by the Truth in Lending Act. See 
Roland E. Brandel & Eustace A. Olliff III, The Electronic Fund Transfer Act: A Primer, 
40 Omo ST. L.J. 531, 537 (1979) (noting that the EFTA "borrows concepts and 
techniques for legal control" from the Truth in Lending Act, as well as from other 
legislation such as the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ l666-66j (1994), and the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-168lt (1994)). One difference in the 
liability provisions of the Truth in Lending Act and the EFTA is that the Truth in 
Lending Act caps consumer liability in all circumstances at $50. As under the EFT A, 
under the Truth in Lending Act a card holder's negligence is irrelevant to the issue of 
liability, and the card issuer bears the burden of proof on authorization. 15 U.S.C. 
§ !643(b)(l 994). In addition to applying to traditional credit cards, the Truth in Lending 
Act's liability provisions apply to utility credit cards, such as those supplied by a phone 
company and used to procure telecommunications services. See, e.g., Chartways 
Technologies, Inc. v. AT&T Communications, 6 F.C.C.R. 2852, 2954 (1991). Thus, 
when a customer's calling card is used fraudulently, that customer's liability is limited 
to $50. The Truth in Lending Act does not apply to the type of telecommunications toll 
fraud discussed infra, Section V(C). 
133. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(a)(l) (1996). 
134. 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(l) (1996). 
135. 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(2)(i) (1996). 
136. 15 U.S.C. § l693g(2)(b) (1994). 
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Governors of the Federal Reserve System), but rather, a private key is a device 
for creating a digital signature, which satisfies a requirement of a signature as 
provided in Guideline 5.1 [which states that legal signature requirements are 
satisfied by a digital signature which meets certain specifications]. Therefore, 
loss of a private key is not governed by the provisions of Regulation E 
concerning the loss of an access device, see 12 C.F.R 205.6 (1994) [which, 
amon6 other things, limits consumer liability for unauthorized fund trans-fers]. 7 
This assertion is ultimately unpersuasive, however. The plain language 
of the EFTA's "access device" definition would include many forms of 
digital signature technology, although perhaps not literally the private 
encryption key itself. In the Susan/Irving scenario, Susan stored her 
private key on a floppy disk. An alternative method for storing a private 
key would be on a credit card-like "smart card." In either case, the disk 
or card and the information stored on the disk or card would appear to 
fall within the realm of a "card, code, or other means of access to a 
consumers account, or any combination thereof, that may be used by the 
consumer for the purpose of initiating electronic funds transfers." In a 
1994 work analyzing the possible implementation of a federal certifica-
tion authority (FCA), Michael Baum, who chairs the committee which 
issued the Digital Signature Guidelines, discusses the potential applica-
bility of the EFTA to digital signature technology under certain 
circumstances. Baum describes how "the FCA may issue certificates, or 
FCA-users may hold their private keys and/or create digital signatures 
using a card technology in a form analogous to traditional credit, debit, 
or automated teller machine ('ATM') cards."138 Baum cites an inter-
view with a U.S. Treasury Department representative who notes that "[i]f 
the FCA is implemented using card technologies, [portions of] such card 
usage would probably be interpreted as coming under the purview of 
Reg. E."139 Baum's proposals concerning an FCA assume the non-
involvement of consumers, "[b ]ecause of the added complexity and risks 
typically imposed on the providers of consumer products and servic-
es."140 Addressing the larger policy issue, Baum notes that 
137. DRAFT DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 118, § 4.3.5. 
138. MICHAEL S. BAUM, FEDERAL CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY LIABILITY AND 
POLICY 262 (1994). This 388 page (plus appendix), extensively footnoted book provides 
a comprehensive survey of the wide array of legal issues implicated by a proposed 
federal certification authority, and is highly recommended as a resource for anyone 
interested in the legal issues surrounding the implementation of a public key infrastruc-
ture. It is published by the U.S. Department of Commerce's National Technical 
Infom1ation Service as Report No. PB94-191202. 
139. Id. at 267. 
140. Id. at 18. 
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consumer protection legislation in the payment systems area can be viewed as 
a means for consumers to deal with organizations, systems, and processes that 
are somehow 'beyond' them. To the extent that the establishment of the FCA 
would constitute a radical departure from existing practices, similar protections 
may be appropriate for even sophisticated business concerns. 141 
The argument that the EFTA would preempt the Utah Act and apply 
to some transactions which use digital signatures is buttressed by the 
broad consumer-protection mandate the law provides the Federal Reserve 
Board. This broad mandate also highlights the importance of the 
consumer-protection policy which underlies the Electronic Fund Transfer 
Act. The EFTA confers broad authority142 on the Board to prescribe 
regulations to further the EFTA's primary objective of providing 
individual consumer rights.143 The Board's authority is a function of 
whether funds transfers are initiated electronically, whether current laws 
provide adequate consumer safeguards, and whether coverage under the 
EFTA is necessary to achieve the EFTA's basic objectives. 144 Con-
gress contemplated that, as no person can foresee electronic fund transfer 
developments, "regulations would keep pace with new services and 
assure that the [EFTA's] basic protections continue to apply."145 Thus, 
in "the event that electronic fund transfer services are made available to 
consumers by a person other than a financial institution holding a 
consumer's account, the Board shall by regulation assure that the 
disclosures, protections, responsibilities, and remedies created by this 
title are made applicable to such persons and services."146 
In the absence of new regulations from the Federal Reserve Board, 
however, many types of transactions that would utilize digital signatures 
would fall well outside the purview of the EFTA. The EFTA thus does 
not comprehensively replace the liability allocations of the Utah Act 
through preemption. The EFTA would not be applicable to any 
141. Id. at 239. 
142. "This provision (15 U.S.C. § 1693b(c), which defines some duties of the 
Board] is virtually identical to section I 05 of the Truth in Lending Act, a provision 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as granting the Board great discretion 
in defining coverage. The Court consistently has recognized the Congress' delegation 
of broad authority to the Board." 58 Fed. Reg. 8714, 8715-16 (1993). 
143. 15 U.S.C. § l693(b) (1994). 
144. 58 Fed. Reg. 8714, 8715 (1993). 
145. S. REP. No. 95-915, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9403, 9412. 
146. 15 U.S.C. § l693b(4)(d) (1994). 
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transaction not involving a "consumer" and a "financial institution."147 
Digital signatures could be used for many activities other than electronic 
fund transfers, such as signing contracts or filing legal documents. If a 
particular fraudulent transaction utilizing digital signatures involves a 
consumer, a financial institution, and an electronic fund transfer, the 
EFTA will dramatically limit the consumer's liability and place the 
burden of proof in any consequent dispute upon the financial institution. 
If a consumer is victimized in a fraudulent transaction which does not 
include an electronic fund transfer, or which does not involve a financial 
institution, the Utah Act's liability scheme will apply and that consumer 
will be subject to potentially unlimited liability unless that consumer can 
prove that they in fact did not affix the digital signature in question, and 
that they exercised reasonable care in protecting their private key. Even 
assuming that the liability scheme imposed by the Utah Act is more 
appropriate than that of the EFTA because of unique problems posed by 
digital signature technology, the interaction of the Utah Act and the 
EFTA will create, in addition to a complex and confusing legal 
landscape for consumers, a skewed certification authority industry. That 
is, financial institutions, which would otherwise be likely candidates for 
the role of certification authority and frequent users of digitally-signed 
electronic documents, would face dramatically different litigation costs 
and liability exposure than other entities involved in the Utah Act's 
digital signature scheme. 
Digital signature technology does involve some unique risks, and the 
credit card model embodied in the EFTA and in the Truth in Lending 
Act does not provide a perfect fit as a model for liability allocation in 
a public key infrastructure. The credit card model differs from a public 
key infrastructure in at least two important ways. First, the consequenc-
es of consumer negligence in a public key infrastructure are arguably 
more significant than the consequences of consumer negligence in the 
credit card model. The success of a public key infrastructure depends 
upon the security of private keys. If consumers faced a maximum 
liability of $50 for unauthorized transactions which utilized their private 
key, a "moral hazard" problem is created. 148 That is, consumers may 
lack the financial incentive to take adequate steps to keep their private 
147. The term "consumer" means natural person. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(5) (1994). The 
term "financial institution" means a State or National bank, a State or Federal savings 
and loan association, a mutual savings bank, a State or Federal credit union, or any other 
person who, directly or indirectly holds an account belonging to a consumer. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1693a(8) (1994). 
148. See generally READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 2 (Victor P. 
Goldberg ed., 1989). 
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key secure, and may in fact have the incentive to commit fraudulent acts. 
Of course, this same problem exists under the credit card model as 
well. 149 Proponents of heightened liability in the digital signature 
context argue that virtually the only way that fraud involving digital 
signatures can occur is if a holder of a private key somehow discloses 
it,150 whereas fraud in the credit card context can occur in a number 
of different ways, including many that involve no fault on the part of the 
credit card holder. This argument is partly flawed. 151 Nonetheless, the 
general point that the security of private keys is critical to the function-
ing of a public key infrastructure is true, and this fact may justify some 
differing treatment of consumers in a digital signature context in contrast 
to the credit card model. It is not clear, however, that this difference 
justifies the extensive liability exposure that the Utah Act imposes on 
consumers in contrast to the liability policies embodied in the EFTA and 
the Truth in Lending Act. 
A second way in which the credit card model diverges from the reality 
of a public key infrastructure concerns the availability of a "deep 
pocket" entity able to act as a de facto insurer. Under the credit card 
model, financial institutions absorb the costs of fraud and redistribute 
these costs to all of their customers in the form of higher fees, higher 
interest rates, per-use charges to merchants, and the like. In a public key 
infrastructure, certification authorities could conceivably play this role. 
However, unlike financial institutions, certification authorities may not 
be able to limit their liability exposure by accepting as customers only 
those who the CA determined were credit-worthy. Moreover, while the 
149. In the credit card context this problem, to the degree that it is one, is mitigated 
somewhat by the extensive costs imposed upon victimized consumers apart from the $50 
liability cap (which is, in practice, often waived). Consumers who are fraud victims 
must expend considerable time and effort correcting erroneous information on credit 
reports, filing police reports, etc. See, e.g., Marcia Vickers, Stop, Thief! And Give Me 
Back My Name, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1996, § 3, l. See also PRIVACY RIGHTS 
CLEARINGHOUSE, COPING WITH IDENTITY THEFT: WHAT TO 00 WHEN AN IMPOSTOR 
STRIKES ( I 996) (pamphlet produced by San Diego, CA-based consumer group). In light 
of the difficulties victimized consumers face, consumers have considerable incentive to 
keep their credit cards secure. 
150. "[A] person is quite powerless to prevent forgery of her paper signature, but, 
in all but rare instances, only a subscriber can prevent the most likely cause forged 
digital signatures, by keeping the private key safe." UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, 
supra note I, at 20. 
151. See the discussion concerning the implementation of public key cryptographic 
algorithms in Part V(C). 
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recommended reliance limit on a certificate would limit the CAs' 
liability in any single transaction, no analogy to the credit card limits 
imposed by financial institutions exists for transactions involving 
certificates and digital signatures. Nor would CAs profit from each 
transaction in which a subscriber engaged, as financial institutions do 
with credit cards. Many transactions utilizing digital signatures may not 
be financial transactions at all. Additionally, the kinds of fraud that 
occur under the credit card model can often best be prevented by 
vigilance on the part of the financial institution (that is, the financial 
institution is often the "cheapest cost avoider"152), whereas in a public 
key infrastructure the holder of a private key, rather than the certification 
authority, is arguably best positioned to prevent many types of fraud. 
In sum, the liability model embodied in the EFTA and in the Truth in 
Lending Act may not translate effectively to the realm of digital 
signatures. There are two important lessons to be learned from these 
consumer protection statutes, however. First, regardless of whether its 
policies are better or worse than the very different liability policies of 
the Utah Digital Signature Act, the EFTA will apply on its own force to 
certain kinds of transactions which utilize digital signatures, thus 
undermining the comprehensiveness of the Utah Act's liability scheme. 
Second, the EFTA and the Truth in Lending Act illustrate a wide-
ranging federal policy in favor of consumer protection. The Utah Act 
ignores consumer protection as an important policy consideration. By 
doing so, it not only opens itself up to broader federal preemption, but 
also undermines its ostensible goal of promoting the development of a 
public key infrastructure. Consumers will not utilize a system which 
subjects them to potentially unlimited liability. 
B. The Notary Model 
Notaries Public provide a model for liability allocation and allocation 
of evidentiary burdens that can be instructively contrasted to the scheme 
set out in the Utah Act. Some of the activities performed by certifica-
tion authorities are analogous to the activities of notaries. The critical 
function of a certification authority in a public key infrastructure is to 
correctly identify a potential subscriber and issue a certificate which 
assures others of the subscriber's identity. Likewise, in witnessing or 
attesting a signature, the acquisition of evidence that the subscriber is 
152. See generally Gumo CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 135-40 (1997). 
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who he or she purports to be is an essential part of the full and faithful 
execution of a notary's duty. 153 
The "notary model" appears to have been a model which was actively 
contemplated by the drafters of the Utah Act. Some of the terminology 
used in the Utah Act is similar to language used to describe various 
elements of notarial practice. The person who appears before a notary 
is a "subscriber."154 Notarial acts must be evidenced by a "certificate" 
signed and dated by a notarial officer. 155 The Utah Act imposes 
record-keeping requirements on certification authorities that are not 
unlike those typically imposed on notaries. 156 The bonding require-
ments imposed on CAs by the Utah Act are similar to the bonding 
requirements commanded of notaries. 157 Under the Utah Act docu-
ments signed with certain digital signatures are given a legal status 
similar to that of notarized documents. 158 
In taking and certifying an acknowledgment, notaries are required to 
act with the care and diligence that reasonably prudent and cautious 
persons exercise under like circumstances. 159 That is, notaries are held 
to a negligence standard. Thus, a notary is liable to all persons who 
have been defrauded of money as a result of relying upon the genuine-
ness of a document executed by the notary in performance of his or her 
official duties. However, a notary is not a guarantor or an insurer, and 
if the notary is to be held liable at all, it must be on the ground of 
negligence ( or intentional wrongdoing). 160 
In an action to recover against a notary for failure to adequately 
perform required duties, generally the burden is on the plaintiff to prove 
the notary's negligence and show the consequent harm. 161 However, 
if the duty breached is the notary's duty to exercise reasonable care in 
153. 58 AM. }UR. 2D Notaries Public§ 32 (1989). 
154. Id. 
155. UNIFORM LAW ON NOTARIAL ACTS § 7(a), 14 U.L.A. 136 (1982). 
156. Compare UTAH ADMIN. R. 154-10-303 ( 1996) (regulations prescribing record-
keeping practices of certification authorities) with 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notaries Public § 40 
( 1989) (record keeping requirements of notaries). 
157. Compare Utah Act§§ 46-3-103(34)(a), -104(3)(b) and UTAH ADMIN. R. 154-
10-201 (1996) (provisions relating to a certification authority's suitable guaranty) with 
58 AM. JUR. 2D Notaries Public§ 74 (1989) (describing liability ofa surety on a bond 
issued for a notary). 
158. § 46-3-405. 
159. I AM. JUR. 2D Acknowledgments§ 117 (1994). 
160. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notaries Public § 58 (1989). 
161. Id. § 60. 
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establishing a subscriber's identity when taking an acknowledgment, the 
evidentiary burden shifts to the notary to establish that the proper 
standard of care was exercised once a plaintiff establishes that the 
acknowledged signature is forged. 162 Shifting the burden of persuasion 
to the notary once forgery has been determined is justified by the 
probability that the notary was negligent in ascertaining the identity of 
the forger and by the strong public interest in ensuring the accuracy of 
notarial certifications. 163 
The Utah Digital Signature Act imposes a standard of care on 
certification authorities that is similar to the negligence standard imposed 
on notaries, but with some significant qualifications. The Utah Act 
provides that certification authorities shall not be liable "for any loss 
caused by reliance on a false or forged digital signature of a subscriber, 
if, with respect to the false or forged digital signature, the certification 
authority complied with all the material requirements of this chap-
ter. "164 That is, the certification authority who complies with the 
duties articulated elsewhere in the Act enters a "safe harbor," sheltered 
from any risk of liability. The requirements imposed elsewhere in the 
Act are, in many instances, similar to the duties required of a notary 
under a negligence standard. For example, a certification authority must 
confirm the identity of prospective subscribers165 and confirm that the 
information in a certificate to be issued is accurate, 166 as well as 
engage in other, unique duties such as ensuring that a prospective 
subscriber holds a private key capable of creating a digital signature. 167 
In contrast to the more amorphous negligence standard imposed on 
notaries, the question of whether a certification authority has satisfied a 
required duty can usually be answered by a "bright line" test. 
The notary model shifts the burden of persuasion in a dispute over a 
forged acknowledgment or signature once the forgery has been shown. 
That is, once a plaintiff shows that a signature is forged, the burden 
shifts to the notary to prove that the notary exercised the proper standard 
of care. The Utah Digital Signature Act contains no similar provision. 
Thus, a person challenging the practice of a certification authority faces 
I 62. Id. § 66. Similarly, where the failure of a notary's identification of a subscriber 
is established, and consequently the falsity of the notary certificate, the burden of 
persuasion shifts to the notary to show a deception perpetrated through no lack of 
reasonable care. Id. 
163. Id. 
I 64. § 46-3-309(2)(A). 
165. § 46-3-302(b)(i). 
166. § 46-3-302(b)(iii). 
167. § 46-3-302(b)(v). 
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much more difficult evidentiary burdens than a person challenging the 
practice of a notary. 
A proponent of the scheme embodied in the Utah Act might argue that 
this sort of burden-shifting would be inappropriate in the digital 
signature context in light of the policies behind burden-shifting in the 
notary model: the probability that the notary was negligent is ascertain-
ing the identity of the forger and the strong public policy of ensuring the 
accuracy of notarial certifications. These policies arguably carry less 
force when applied to certification authorities. Fraud can easily occur 
in the absence of negligence on the part of the CA because, for example, 
a criminal could discover a subscriber's private key long after a CA 
dutifully identified that subscriber and issued a certificate, and therefore, 
placing this burden on a CA does not further the policy of ensuring 
accurate certifications. This argument most effectively makes a much 
broader point, however: the notary model is not a useful model to apply 
to a public key infrastructure. 
The activities of a certification authority and a notary are fundamental-
ly different, despite superficial similarities. Both the certification 
authority and the notary engage in a process of identification. The 
activities of a notary, however, focus on a particular instrument or 
transaction. A person appears before a notary, document in hand. The 
notary confirms this person's identity, and issues a written certificate that 
states that the person who executed the instrument to which the 
certificate is attached was known to, and appeared before, the notary and 
acknowledged the instrument to be his or her voluntary act. 168 The 
acknowledged instrument is then generally admissible into evidence 
without further proof of its execution, and the burden is upon the person 
challenging its contents to prove his contention by clear and convincing 
evidence. Evidence must be "clearly cogent and convincing beyond any 
reasonable controversy" in order to impeach a notary's certificate.169 
A subscriber generally appears before a certification authority once. 
The CA identifies the subscriber and issues that subscriber a certificate 
containing the public key which corresponds to the private key retained 
by that subscriber. Subsequently, a subscriber can produce an unlimited 
number of electronic documents, all of which will be verified by the 
same original certificate. The Utah Act states: 
168. I AM. JUR. 2D Acknowledgments § I (1994). 
I 69. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notaries Public § 43 (1989). 
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[A] certificate issued by a licensed certification authority is an acknowledgment 
of a digital signature verified by reference to the public key listed in the 
certificate, regardless of whether words of an express acknowledgment appear 
with the digital signature or whether the signer physically appeared before the 
certification authority when the digital signature was created, if that digital 
signature is: (I) verifiable by that certificate; and (2) affixed when that 
certificate was valid. 170 
Thus, documents signed with digital signatures are acknowledged 
documents. The commentary to this portion of the Utah Act notes the 
applicability of Utah Code section 78-25-7, which states that "the 
certificate of ... acknowledgment ... is prima facie evidence of the 
execution of [a] writing."171 The annotations accompanying this 
statute indicate that the effect of a certificate of acknowledgment "will 
not be overthrown upon a mere preponderance of the evidence," but 
rather "the evidence must be clear and convincing."172 Thus, despite 
the fact that documents are not certified individually in the personal 
presence of a notary as they are under the notary model, all instruments 
signed with digital signatures are acknowledged documents and achieve 
a difficult-to-challenge legal status. The notary model is taken too far. 
Digitally-signed documents do not achieve the same assurances of 
genuineness that documents signed in the personal presence of a notary 
achieve, and should not be given the same legal status. Providing 
digitally-signed documents with this status creates unreasonable 
evidentiary burdens for victims of fraud challenging the validity of 
electronic documents signed with the victim's private key. 
C. The Telecommunications Toll Fraud Model 
The liability allocations and evidentiary burdens imposed by the Utah 
Act perhaps most closely resemble the law concerning telecommunica-
tions toll fraud. Toll fraud entails a third party "hacker" gaining remote 






UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-25-7 (l 992). 
Id. (citing Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692 (Utah 
173. A PBX is comprised of sophisticated switching equipment which allows 
businesses with many employee telephones to have station-to-station dialing, direct 
dialing to each station from outside the business premises, and a single directory number 
for the business - all without the need to route calls through an attendant. CHARLES H. 
KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 24 (1994). In the 
telecommunications lexicon, PBXs are one type of Customer Premises Equipment (CPE). 
Thus the type of fraud under discussion is sometimes termed CPE fraud. 
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long distance calls that are billed to the owner of the system. 174 The 
magnitude of the resulting fraud can be enormous. For example, the 
non-profit San Ysidro Health Center, which serves a low-income 
clientele near the Mexican border just south of San Diego, received a 
bill for $82,000 in fraudulent calls. 175 AT&T sued San Ysidro Health 
Center to compel payment of this bill.176 Under the law applicable to 
telecommunications toll fraud, calls "originate" at a customer's number 
when calls, authorized or not, are made from that customer's telephone 
system. 177 Customers from whose number a call originates are strictly 
liable for that call, regardless of whether the call was placed fraudulent-
ly_ 11s 
Advocates of this system of liability argue that the customer is the 
party with the ability to prevent fraud from occurring, and thus imposing 
liability on the customer creates incentives to minimize fraud. The PBX 
owner has primary care, custody, and control of the PBX equipment, and 
thus can best take preventative steps to eliminate fraud. 179 This 
liability scheme and its underlying rationale have proven controversial. 
One commentator notes that "[f]ew telecommunications issues in recent 
years have created more concern ... than the PBX toll fraud prob-
lem_,,1so 
Critics of the PBX toll fraud liability scheme point out that other 
parties, in addition to the PBX owner, are well-positioned to prevent 
fraud. Long distance companies can take steps to prevent fraud. One 
company that suffered $300,000 in toll fraud losses noted that in one 
month their "800" number usage jumped from 100 calls to over 10,000, 
and their international calls jumped from a few hours per month to 
"thousands" of hours. Their long distance carrier, AT&T, did not inform 
them of any problem; the victimized company learned of the fraud when 
174. Thomas K. Crowe, Companies at Riskfrom Toll Fraud, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, 
Apr. 1993, at 39. 
175. Joe Cantelupe, $82,000 Phone Bill Has Shrill Ring At Health Center, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., April 15, 1995, at B 1. 
176. Id. 
177. AT&T v. Jiffy Lube Intl., Inc., 813 F. Supp. 1164, 1167 (D. Md.) (citing 
Chartways Technologies, Inc. v. AT&T Communications, 6 F.C.C.R. 2852 (1991 )). 
178. See generally Businesses Pay for Toll Fraud, TELECOMM. ALERT, Feb. 5, 1996, 
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, NWLTRS File. 
179. REP. ON AT&T, supra note 129, at 2. 
180. Thomas K. Crowe, Long Distance Services Theft: Who Pays?, NAT. L. J., Oct. 
19, 1992, at 19. 
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they received the bill. 181 Similarly, the manufacturers of PBX equip-
ment can prevent fraud, by building security functions into the PBX 
equipment and teaching customers to use these functions, and by alerting 
customers to potential risks concerning the equipment which they 
otherwise might not be made aware. Because long distance companies 
and PBX equipment manufacturers face little liability risk, however, they 
have little incentive to take these prudent steps. 182 
Like the law of telecommunications toll fraud, the Utah Digital 
Signature Act places a significant risk of liability on a subscrib-
er/customer, with the rationale that the subscriber is best positioned to 
prevent fraud (by safeguarding the subscriber's private key) and thus will 
have the appropriate incentives to do so. In the toll fraud arena, the 
liability standard imposed on customers is strict liability. Under the 
Utah Digital Signature Act, the standard imposed on subscribers is, 
ostensibly, a negligence standard. As discussed supra, however, the 
burden on a subscriber who is attacking a fraudulently signed digital 
document is an onerous one. If a hacker breaks into a subscriber's 
computer system, gains access to a subscriber's private key, and creates 
a large number of facially valid but fraudulent electronic documents, that 
subscriber will face enormous practical hurdles in challenging those 
electronic documents. Thus, for many subscribers, particularly those 
who lack the resources necessary to pursue their rights in court, the Utah 
Act imposes a de facto strict liability standard. 
The telecommunications toll fraud model is effective as an analogy for 
a public key infrastructure in some respects because it introduces an 
actor who is ignored in the Utah Act and in the credit card model and 
notary model considered supra: the equipment manufacturer. The 
hardware and software used to create digital signatures is a critical weak 
point in the framework of a public key infrastructure. While the Utah 
Act empowers the Division of Corporations and Corporate Code to 
"review software for use in creating digital signatures and publish reports 
concerning software,"183 the Act is otherwise silent on the issue of the 
duties of equipment manufacturers. 
Cryptographic algorithms are at the core of a public key infrastructure. 
For these algorithms to fulfill their promise, it is absolutely essential that 
18\. Complaints on Toll Fraud Aired at FCC En Banc Hearing, COMM. DAILY, 
Oct. 13, 1992, at I, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, NWLTRS File. 
I 82. See supra note 129. 
183. § 46-3-104(3)(c). The 1995 version of the Act empowered the Division to 
"approve asymmetric cryptosystems for use in signing certificates issued by licensed 
certification authorities," and to issue rules addressing the "suitability of algorithms for 
use in fulfilling the requirements of this chapter." UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 46-3-501(4), -
501(5)(c) (Supp. 1995) (repealed 1996). 
1184 
[VOL. 33: 1143, 1996] Misplaced Priorities 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
they be implemented correctly. This is not an easy task. For example, 
the Netscape Navigator World Wide Web browser uses the RSA public 
key algorithm for encryption. A criminal who wanted to decrypt a 
message encrypted using Netscape's system and who didn't have the key 
would, theoretically, need a supercomputer and thousands of years in 
order to decipher it. However, in September of 1995, two Berkeley 
graduate students discovered a flaw in Netscape's implementation of the 
RSA algorithm, which allowed them to decrypt encrypted messages in 
a matter of seconds. 184 Similarly, in March of 1996 a security flaw in 
the Java programming language was announced, a flaw which would 
allow an attacker to surreptitiously add and remove data from the 
computers of visitors to a Web site which exploited the flaw. 185 This 
flaw conceivably would allow a criminal to capture a visitor's private 
key, as described in the Susan/Irving hypothetical, supra. A theoretical 
virus-born attack on the private keys of PGP users has been announced 
on the Cypherpunks mailing list. 186 The implementation of crypto-
graphic algorithms is a difficult and risky process. 187 
The liability allocations of the Utah Act can be subject to the same 
criticism that has been directed at the liability rules embodied in the law 
of toll fraud. Subscribers bear an immense amount of risk under the 
Utah Act. If electronic documents are fraudulently signed with a 
subscriber's digital signature, that subscriber faces a substantial 
possibility that he or she will bear any resulting loss. To some degree, 
a subscriber can prevent fraud by taking steps to safeguard the subscrib-
er's private key. However, a private key can be discovered in ways that 
are totally outside the control of a subscriber. Generating key pairs, for 
184. Bill Orr, The Netscape Debacle: Healthy Wakeup Call? AM. BANKERS Ass'N 
BANKING J., November 1995, at 74. See also Levy, supra note 21. 
185. Don Clark, Researchers Find Big Security Flaw in Java Language, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 26, I 996, at B4. 
I 86. E-mail message from Bill Frantz to C. Bradford Biddle (Feb. 22, I 996) 
(describing PGP attack developed by Frantz and noting that a description of the attack 
had been posted to the Cypherpunks list, archived at <http://www.hks.net/cpunks/>) 
(printed copy on file with author). For general information about PGP, see GARFINKEL, 
supra note 52. For more information about the Cypherpunks, an informally-organized 
group dedicated to defending privacy with cryptography, anonymous electronic mail 
forwarding systems, digital signatures, and electronic currency, visit the list archives. 
187. Another example of the difficulties inherent in implementing encryption 
schemes can be found in First Virtual Holdings Identifies Major Flaw in Software-Based 
Encryption of Credit Cards; Numbers Easily Captured by Automated Program, PR 
NEWSWIRE, February 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, NWLTRS File. 
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example, is a notoriously tricky process. If the hardware or software 
used to generate key pairs is flawed, private keys could be easily 
discovered. 188 In the context of toll fraud, one toll fraud victim said 
"PBX owners should not be responsible for I 00 percent of the toll fraud 
if we don't control 100 percent of our destiny."189 The same principle 
applies in a public key infrastructure. The heavy burden of liability 
which the Utah Act places on subscribers is inappropriate in light of the 
fact that there is a substantial likelihood of fraud occurring which is not 
the result of a subscribers negligence, but instead based on faulty 
hardware or software. Some measure of liability risk should explicitly 
be placed on hardware and software providers in order to ensure that 
adequate care is taken to prevent this sort of fraud. 
D. A Proposal Based on Unenacted Toll Fraud Reforms 
The law of telecommunications toll fraud has been roundly criticized, 
and reform efforts have been launched on several fronts. In 1993, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) designed to address toll fraud prob-
lems.190 This rulemaking effort appears to have stalled. In 1992, the 
Telephone Toll Fraud Remedies Act (TTFRA) was introduced in 
Congress. 191 The TTFRA was not enacted, but it nonetheless provides 
an instructive alternative to liability allocation in the world of toll fraud, 
and thus can serve as a model for liability allocation in a public key 
infrastructure. 
The TTFRA was designed to achieve two purposes: (1) to prevent toll 
fraud by requiring PBX equipment makers and sellers to adequately 
warn customers about the possibility of toll fraud, inform customers 
about the appropriate precautions to take to prevent such fraud, and alert 
customers to the risk of financial exposure they assume when purchasing 
PBX equipment; and, (2) to provide a mechanism for adjudicating toll 
fraud liability disputes. 192 The TTFRA provided that disputes involv-
ing allegations of toll fraud be subject to arbitration at the option of a 
188. See supra notes 21 and 183. 
189. REP. ON AT&T, supra note 129. 
190. Policies and Rules Concerning Toll Fraud, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,153 (1993) 
(proposed Dec. 13, 1993). Among other things, this NPRM noted that the FCC had 
"tentatively concluded that carrier tariff provisions that historically have placed strict 
liability on customers that are victims of toll fraud without acknowledging any obligation 
by the carriers to warn customers of risks of using carrier services are unreasonable." 
Id. at 65,154. 
191. H.R. 6066, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). 
192. Id.§ 3. 
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customer (and not at the expense of the customer).193 The Act empha-
sizes timely resolution of disputes. 194 The arbitration would involve 
the customer, the common carrier, and the equipment manufacturer or 
dealer. 195 The TTFRA called upon the FCC to develop security 
guidelines for use by customers in guarding their PBX equipment. 196 
Presumably a customer who adhered to these guidelines would avoid 
liability for negligence. If a customer was found to be negligent, they 
would be held liable for the loss caused by the fraud. The TTFRA is 
silent concerning burdens of proof and sufficiency of evidence. 
Many of the principles of the TTFRA can be applied in the context of 
a public key infrastructure. The Act's emphasis on adequate warnings 
certainly translates to the realm of digital signatures. Subscribers must 
be informed by their hardware or software provider about steps that they 
should take to adequately protect their private keys, and must be 
informed about the liability exposure that they face when participating 
in a public key infrastructure. The TTFRA's dispute resolution 
mechanism may translate to the world of digital signatures as well. 
Subscribers who challenge a digital signature as fraudulent could have 
the opportunity to immediately appeal to an arbitrator or "expert agency" 
with expertise in electronic transactions. If that subscriber can show that 
they did not affix the digital signature in question (the evidentiary 
burden here should certainly be lower than "clear and convincing 
evidence") and that they adhered to clearly articulated guidelines in 
protecting their private key, then that subscriber should not bear the full 
brunt of the loss. 
The recipient of a facially valid digitally-signed document should not 
necessarily fully bear the loss either; otherwise, reliance on digitally-
signed documents will be chilled and the benefits of a public key 
infrastructure lost. Instead, the arbitrator could apportion the loss 
between the hardware/software provider, the repository, the certification 
authority, and the subscriber, depending on relative degree of fault. If 
a software system is cracked, for example, enabling the fraud, then the 
software provider should be liable. Likewise if a CA or a repository 
causes a loss, they should be responsible. 
193. Id. § 4(b)(6), 4(b)(6)(B). 
194. Id. § 4(d). 
195. Id. § 4(b)(6). 
196. Id. § 4(b )(3 ). 
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One difficult question arises when no entity is clearly at fault; that is, 
when subscriber, CA, recipient, software/hardware provider, and 
repository all perform as well as can reasonably be expected, and yet a 
loss still occurs. In such a situation the loss should fall on the recipient, 
the party that chose to rely on the fraudulent digitally signed message. 
This party is best able to assess the risks associated with relying on any 
particular message. If the potential risk of loss is high, this party can 
make "out of band" contacts (i.e., telephone or in-person contacts) with 
the ostensible sender to obtain assurances about the authenticity of the 
message, or can choose not to rely on the message at all. 
Another difficult question arises when a consumer-subscriber, after 
being provided specific, understandable guidelines concerning how to 
protect his or her private key, fails to comply with those guidelines, 
resulting in a substantial loss. Having a consumer bear potentially 
unlimited liability does not comport with the policy of consumer 
protection embodied in the EFTA and Truth in Lending Act. Further-
more, consumers may not choose to participate in the infrastructure if 
they are potentially subject to unlimited liability, although the force of 
this argument is reduced if the guidelines with which a consumer must 
comply in order to avoid liability are clear and reasonable (thus making 
the risk of unlimited liability low). Perhaps the best approach in this 
scenario is to simply cap consumer liability, even for negligent failure 
to comply with the applicable guidelines, at a fixed amount in a fashion 
similar to the EFTA. The amount should be much higher than the $50 
limit in the EFTA-perhaps $1000----or perhaps could be tiered based on 
the degree of fault-i.e., $500 for "ordinary negligence," $2500 for 
"gross negligence," $5000 for "recklessness" and no limit for intentional 
wrongs. While this approach will potentially impose unreimbursed 
losses on parties who rely on digital signatures, presumably parties 
would take this into account in their risk-benefit calculus when choosing 
to rely on a digital signature. In a large dollar transaction, the relying 
party may choose to obtain out of band assurances. In a small dollar 
transaction, the relying party may simply choose to accept this risk of 
loss. 
Insurance should eventually address the problem of unreimbursed 
losses. A private insurance market will not develop immediately, 
however, because of the lack of a pattern of loss experience and other 
factors. 197 In the meantime, the proposal outlined above could provide 
parties participating in a public key infrastructure with a reasonable 
197. BAUM, supra note 138, at 338. 
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degree of certainty, enabling them to make rational economic choices, 
without abandoning the policy of consumer protection. 
E. A Liability Cap for Certification Authorities? 
Turning back to the public key infrastructure actually implemented by 
the Utah Digital Signature Act, a final criticism of the Act's liability 
provisions is in order. The Utah Act provides a de facto liability cap for 
certification authorities, which under easily-envisioned circumstances 
will preclude complete recovery for numerous innocent defrauded 
parties. This policy decision will undermine the integrity of the 
infrastructure the Act is designed to promote. 
It is easy to envision a scenario in which a CA's private key is 
compromised. One way that this could occur is through brute force 
cryptanalysis: a "factoring attack."198 That is, a criminal could simply 
dedicate the immense amount of computing power needed and "break" 
the underlying algorithm, discovering a CA's private key from an 
analysis of the CA's public key. Alternatively, a criminal could 
threaten, blackmail, or torture an employee of the certification authority, 
forcing the employee to surrender the CA's private key, a process 
described as "rubber hose cryptanalysis."199 The criminal could bribe 
a CA employee: a "purchase-key attack."200 An incompetent employ-
ee could simply reveal the key accidentally. A flaw in the hardware and 
software utilized by the CA could be discovered and exploited. 
The compromise of a CA private key could be catastrophic. A 
publication from RSA Laboratories notes that "[i]t is extremely 
198. At the risk of immensely oversimplifying the issue, the mathematical premise 
behind public key cryptography is that it is easy to multiply two prime numbers to get 
a third number, but it is very difficult to "factor" that third number and recover those 
two primes. Generating a key pair involves multiplying two large primes. Figuring out 
a private key from a public key involves factoring a large number. If the number (or 
"key length") is large enough (i.e., 300 digits or more), one expert estimates it would 
take more than $300 trillion in computing resources to determine a private key from a 
public key. SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY, supra note 7, 45-46, 49. Public key 
cryptographic algorithms are often implemented with relatively short key lengths 
because of export restriction imposed by the U.S. Government, however, and can be 
broken through a "brute-force" attack. See Levy , supra note 21, at 134, 196-200 
(describing the successful effort to break the export version of Netscape Navigator's 40-
bit encryption key). 
199. SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, supra note 7, at 7. 
200. Id. 
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important that private keys of certifying authorities are stored securely 
because compromise would enable undetectable forgeries."201 A 
criminal who discovers the private key of a certification authority could 
produce an unlimited number of ostensibly valid certificates. The 
criminal could enter into fraudulent transactions under a host of assumed 
names, or could create certificates in the name or particular individuals 
or corporations and impersonate those individuals or corporations 
electronically. Moreover, once a CA's private key was compromised 
and the corresponding public key revoked, all certificates issued by that 
CA would be invalid. All of the subscribers who utilized that CA would 
be forced to obtain new certificates.202 The costs associated with a 
compromised CA key dramatically outweigh the costs associated with 
a compromised subscriber key. 
A criminal with a certification authority's private key could cause an 
immense amount of financial damage, imposing huge losses on a number 
of innocent parties. These innocent parties would be unable to recover 
their full losses from a negligent certification authority if the total of 
these losses was greater than the amount of that certification authority's 
"suitable guaranty." A suitable guaranty is either a surety bond or an 
irrevocable letter of credit that meets certain administrative specifica-
tions203 and is designed to facilitate recovery of any judgment obtained 
against a CA. The Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code 
is empowered to determine an amount appropriate for a suitable guaranty 
in a rulemaking proceeding, in light of the burden a suitable guaranty 
places upon licensed certification authorities and the assurance of 
financial responsibility it provides to persons who rely on certificates 
issued by licensed certification authorities.204 The Act states that "[a] 
201. RSA FAQ, supra note 7, § 3.8. 
202. Id. § 3.10. 
203. § 46-3-103(34)(a). 
204. § 46-3-104(3)(b). The 1995 version of the Utah Act did not delegate this 
power to the rulemaking process, and instead set out a formula for calculating the 
amount of a suitable guaranty in the statute itself. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-
103(34)(A)(II) (Supp. 1995) (repealed 1996) provided that the amount of the suitable 
guaranty be the greater of either (a) I 00% of the largest recommended reliance limit of 
any certificate issued by a certification authority, or (b) 35% of the total recommended 
reliance limits of all certificates issued by a certification authority. Recommended 
reliance limits are dollar figures specified in a certificate which indicate the certification 
authority's liability and financial responsibility limits in transactions using that certificate. 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 46-3-103(26) (Supp. 1995) (repealed 1996); 1996 Utah Laws§ 46-
3-103(28). This issue was discussed at the October 3, 1995 meeting of the Utah Digital 
Signature Legislative Facilitation Committee. The minutes to this meeting note: 
The definition of "suitable guaranty" was discussed extensively. Mr. [David 
W.] Moore [representing Utah Title and Escrow School] stated that the cost 
of the bond or letter of credit required by the suitable guaranty provision may 
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suitable guaranty may also provide that the total annual liability on the 
guaranty to all persons making claims based on it may not exceed the 
face amount of the guaranty."205 Financial institutions acting as 
certification authorities are exempted from the requirement of posting a 
suitable guaranty. 206 
If a defrauded subscriber obtains a judgment against a certification 
authority, they can recover that judgment plus attorney's fees from the 
CA's suitable guaranty.207 However, the total liability on the suitable 
guaranty to all persons making claims upon it cannot exceed the amount 
of the suitable guaranty.208 Thus, in the easily-envisioned scenario of 
widespread fraud caused by a CA's compromised private key, defrauded 
subscribers may not be able to recover the full amount of their losses 
from the negligent CA. The CA's liability is effectively capped at the 
amount of their suitable guaranty. All of the defrauded subscribers may 
be able to obtain judgments against the CA. However, no rational 
businessperson entering the CA business would organize the business in 
such a manner as to create liability exposure beyond that required by the 
suitable guaranty. The CA will do business in a corporate form which 
will make the CA essentially judgment-proof in the event of catastrophic 
widespread fraud based on a compromised private key.209 There are 
no other financial responsibility provisions in the Utah Act, and thus the 
suitable guaranty will serve as a liability cap. 
The risk of a compromised certification authority private key is a very 
serious risk in a public key infrastructure. Because the rewards from 
eliminate title companies from the market since their product guarantees the 
validity of a mortgage. He suggested setting a less onerous standard by 
Administrative Rule. Mr. [Alan] Asay [representing the Utah Division of 
Corporations] . . . stated that the percentages expressed in this Subsection are 
not based on industry track records because no such record exists . . . . Mr. 
Asay suggested amending the suitable guaranty amount to half of what is 
currently stated in the law. Mr. [Michael] Wims [of the Utah Attorney 
General's Office] made a motion that the amount of the bond or letter of credit 
be established by Administrative Rule. This motion passed unanimously. 
Minutes of The Utah Digital Signatures Act Legislation Facilitation Committee (October 
3, 1995) (copy on file with author). 
205. § 46-3-103(34)(b). 
206. § 46-3-103(34)(c). 
207. § 46-3-310. It is unclear whether a subscriber could collect attorney's fees in 
an action against a financial institution serving as a CA. 
208. § 46-3-310(2). 
209. For a summary of how the corporate form can serve to limit liability, see 
ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS§§ 13.6, 13.8 (1989). 
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successfully obtaining a CA's private key could be great, criminals will 
likely expend considerable resources trying to obtain the private keys of 
CAs. CAs must guard their private keys with extreme vigilance. 
Capping the CA's liability when the CA negligently discloses their 
private key is an undesirable public policy. If a certification authority 
does not have to potentially bear the full costs of any losses resulting 
from a compromised private key, they may not have the incentive to 
take expensive precautions to protect against that occurrence.210 
The rationale of the drafters of the Utah Act in limiting the liability 
of CAs is, presumably, to foster development of a certification authority 
industry.211 Assuming that this is a worthy goal, capping CAs' 
liability does not accomplish it effectively.212 As noted, CAs will not 
have adequate incentives to take expensive precautions to protect their 
private key. Moreover, the CA who is negligent will be able to 
externalize the costs of their negligence onto otherwise innocent 
defrauded subscribers and other parties. A more sensible approach 
would be to require all CAs to insure against this type of catastrophe. 
The discipline of an insurance market would promote appropriate 
investment on the part of the CAs in light of the relevant risk. 
A private insurance market may not develop immediately,213 al-
though faced with the prospect of numerous CAs required to purchase 
expensive insurance coverage it is certainly possible that a competitive 
insurance industry could quickly develop an appropriate insurance 
package. In the meantime, perhaps the state could temporarily act as an 
insurer, creating an insurance pool from proceeds collected from all CAs. 
The passage of digital signature legislation indicates that state legisla-
tures have determined that the development of a public key infrastructure 
is beneficial to the public. The perceived benefits of a public key 
infrastructure may warrant state involvement to promote the development 
of a private sector insurance pool, in order to maximize preventative 
steps taken to avoid a serious risk, and to guarantee recovery for 
innocent public key infrastructure participants in the event of CA 
negligence. 
210. See generally Calabresi, supra note 152. 
211. See, e.g., UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note I, at 58: "As with any 
other business enterprise, a certification authority must be able to assess and manage its 
risk of exposure to potential liability, and one of the principal impediments to the 
emergence of certification authorities has been the uncertainty of the legal risks such a 
business would undertake." 
212. The liability cap imposed by the Utah Act can be criticized as a subsidy 
designed to foster development of a favored industry. See generally MORTON J. 
HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERJCAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977). 
213. BAUM, supra note 138, at 338. 
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The liability provisions of the Utah Digital Signature Act create an 
attractive legal environment for the entrepreneur contemplating a 
business as a certification authority. If a CA complies with explicitly 
defined rules, they enter a safe harbor, sheltered from liability. Even if 
the CA fails to comply with these rules and negligently imposes losses 
on large numbers of subscribers, the CA enjoys a de facto liability cap. 
The drafters of the Utah Act evidently believe that, with legal risks so 
clearly defined, entrepreneurs will rush to enter the CA market, creating 
a public key infrastructure, which, presumably, will benefit all who 
participate in it. This view must be questioned. Consumers who 
participate in the infrastructure developed under the Utah Act subject 
themselves to extensive liability risk compared to a variety of analogous 
situations, and face difficult evidentiary burdens in resolving disputes 
which arise under the Act. Consumers will not participate in a system 
that subjects them to such dramatic risks. Moreover, by limiting the 
liability of CAs to an amount which is less than the actual damages a 
certification authority can cause, the economic integrity of the infrastruc-
ture is weakened. The Utah Digital Signature Act manifests misplaced 
priorities. Promoting the development of a public key infrastructure is 
a worthwhile goal. However, it should not be accomplished by 
abandoning the policy of consumer protection embodied in the EFTA 
and other federal legislation, nor should it be accomplished by encourag-
ing development of a system which allows enterprises to externalize the 
costs of their negligence, thus producing a less-than-robust infrastructure. 
Indeed, by ignoring the policies of consumer protection and economic 
integrity, the Utah Digital Signature Act may ultimately undermine 
development of the infrastructure that the Act is ostensibly designed to 
promote. 
C. BRADFORD BIDDLE 
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